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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is comprised of two essays that examine consumer responses to
product and service failures. In essay 1, I use the U.S. automobile industry as a backdrop
to investigate how consumers respond when their products experience a defect-related
failure identified by the manufacturer that necessitates a recall. I develop a conceptual
framework to test the impact of a regulator-initiated digital marketing campaign (DMC)
on consumer compliance to product recalls. The empirical context is the launch of a
nationwide DMC by the U.S. automobile industry’s regulator. The analysis spans 12
quarters of recall completion data pertaining to 296 recalls falling on either side of the
DMC’s launch. The results show that the DMC improves consumer recall compliance by
10.9% over its duration, an effect mediated by heightened consumer recall awareness.
With regards to moderators, the DMC is more effective for products with a higher
perceived susceptibility to risk but less effective when consumers face concurrent recalls.
The findings should help regulators make compelling cases for larger budgets to be
allocated for recall compliance efforts.
In essay 2, I examine how consumers respond to product or service failures (i.e.,
issues) by visiting online communities to collaboratively create service solutions with
fellow consumers. I describe their interactions as “user-generated service” (UGS), a form
of customer engagement. I develop a conceptual framework to test the moderating impact
of firm involvement in these communities on UGS volume. I gather data on four firms
across their firm-owned and firm-unowned online platforms in which UGS takes place.
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In total, I analyze over 59,000 posts made by service-seeking consumers from 2013 to
2017. The results show that a firm’s ownership of the platform (i.e., forum) negatively
moderates the impact of customer sentiment, anger, and anxiety on UGS engagement
volume. Additionally, firm employees’ participation in the UGS negatively moderates the
impact of customer anxiety on engagement. I use an experiment to demonstrate that the
negative impact of firm platform ownership extends beyond service-related engagement.
These findings should help marketers tasked with fostering customer engagement
consider the role firms should play in online communities comprised of service-seeking
customers.
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CHAPTER 1
REGULATING PRODUCT RECALL COMPLIANCE IN THE DIGITAL
AGE: EVIDENCE FROM THE “SAFE CARS SAVE LIVES” CAMPAIGN
Product recalls and consumer safety are regulated by government agencies in
several countries, including the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and Japan. While issuing a recall notice to inform consumers of a potential issue is
critical, the importance of expeditiously repairing defective products cannot be
overstated. Unfortunately, far too many defective products remain unremedied long after
their recall notifications have been sent to consumers. For instance, J.D. Power reports
that recall completion rates in the U.S. automobile industry are quite low, with
approximately 30%-50% of vehicles on the road at any point in time having an
unrepaired safety problem (J.D. Power 2016). According to a report by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission (CPSC), only 10% of children’s products recalled in 2012
were successfully corrected, replaced, or returned (McElhaney 2014). Similarly, since the
2016 recall of millions of IKEA Malm dressers, only 1% of consumers, at best, have had
the unstable furniture removed and been issued a refund (Consumers Union 2018).
The continued use of defective products by consumers is a serious public health
concern and it raises the specter of injuries and fatalities. The sustained string of
casualties in 2018 because of faulty Takata airbags, a safety problem for which a recall
was issued in late 2014, underscores the perils of low recall completion rates.
Unsurprisingly, regulatory agencies have been subjected to intense scrutiny and even
1

rebuke for not taking adequate measures to improve recall compliance. For example, an
audit report released in 2018 by the U.S. Department of Transportation faults the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) agency for a lack of proper
oversight of the recall completion process (OIG 2018).
While numerous factors likely contribute to poor recall compliance, low
consumer awareness is often noted as a key issue responsible for inaction. In fact,
William A. Boehly, the NHTSA’s former Associate Administrator for Enforcement,
stated that a lack of public knowledge is “the single greatest weakness” in successfully
addressing product recalls (Gibson 1995). Over 20 years later, focus group interviews
conducted by the NHTSA to increase understanding of the reasons for low recall
completion rates found that while over 70% of consumers preferred electronic recall
notifications, only 7.4% reported receiving any. Importantly, 90% of the respondents
mentioned that recall notifications received electronically had a greater chance of being
noticed (GAO 2017). In the past, regulatory agencies like the CPSC have conducted
targeted national campaigns to raise public awareness, support industry compliance, and
improve safety in specific consumer product categories. For example, in 2010, the CPSC
launched a national public awareness campaign to reduce child drowning and drain
entrapments in swimming pools and spas (CPSC 2013). The issue of low consumer
awareness has proven so pervasive over time that in 2014, the CPSC announced a contest
that asked for innovative tools to inform the public of recalls of consumer products
(Federal Register 2014).
Although regulators introduce such initiatives in the hopes of raising consumer
awareness and reducing accidents, empirical evidence to support or refute these
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expectations is not consistent. A concern is that campaigns by regulatory agencies might
not be effective policy instruments if consumers view them as symbolic acts by
government officials and that their effectiveness could be muted in certain consumer
groups (Edelman 1988; Grinstein and Nisan 2009). In addition, prior research finds that
consumers could develop reactance to public awareness campaigns related to regulation
because they view such efforts as infringements on their personal freedoms (Clee and
Wicklund 1980). Recent evidence from popular press supports this contention. For
example, a 2018 survey of over 1,500 consumers in the U.S. revealed that almost twothirds of them did not believe that product recall programs initiated by the government
had much to do with increasing consumer safety. Instead, many consumers viewed
product recall programs as exercises in government “red-tape” (PR Newswire 2018).
The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of a digital marketing
campaign (DMC hereafter) initiated by a regulator on consumer recall compliance. The
manuscript makes three contributions to the marketing literature. First, this study is the
only one that I am aware of that investigates whether a DMC by a regulator is effective at
improving consumer recall compliance. The product recall literature has predominantly
focused on the stock market and sales consequences of recalls (e.g., Chen, Ganesan, and
Liu 2009; Gao et al. 2015; Liu, Shankar, and Yun 2017), the ability to learn from and
prevent future recalls (Haunschild and Rhee 2004; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Eilert
2013), and the drivers and consequences of product recall timing decisions (Eilert et al.
2017), with little attention devoted to the consumer recall compliance process. A couple
of studies have investigated how factors such as vehicle country of origin, age, and the
extent of publicity around recalls influence completion rates (Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly
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1994; Rupp and Taylor 2002). While these studies examine the effect of recall attributes
on owner responses, the impact of a regulator’s efforts on consumer recall compliance
has received virtually no attention. This study fills these research voids and offers
valuable insights to policymakers.
Specifically, I examine the effectiveness of a DMC initiated by a regulatory
agency. To tackle the problem of low recall completion rates, the NHTSA, the agency
responsible for regulating consumer safety in the U.S. automobile industry, launched its
first nationwide DMC, “Safe Cars Save Lives,” in January of 2016. All consumers in the
U.S. were exposed to the campaign at the same time. The DMC featured paid search and
online display advertisements informing consumers about the risks and hazards of
operating defective vehicles, the importance of checking for open recalls, and provided
links to pertinent recall remedy information.
I exploit this empirical setting to formally test the effectiveness of digital
regulatory efforts to increase consumer recall compliance. The empirical analysis spans
twelve quarters of recall completion data pertaining to 296 product recalls which fall on
either side of the DMC’s launch. The econometric analyses account for various potential
confounds such as the DMC’s possible endogenous nature, time trends in recall
completion rates, recall campaign attributes, and unobserved vehicle make and temporal
characteristics. The results show that over the duration of the DMC, consumer recall
compliance improved by 10.9%, a positive effect that is robust across alternative
methodologies. The improvement in consumer recall compliance is economically
meaningful because of its implication for potentially fewer crashes, casualties, and lower
economic costs.

4

Second, I show that the DMC’s effect on consumer recall compliance is mediated
by heightened consumer recall awareness, as reflected in higher DMC-related paid search
traffic to the regulator’s recall lookup webpages. This finding is significant because some
consumers tend to be unfavorably disposed towards government regulations. As a result,
it is not obvious if consumers would be receptive to government agency-sponsored paid
search advertisements geared towards them. Further, this finding underscores the benefits
of using digital marketing tools to communicate with consumers to increase consumer
recall awareness.
Third, I provide evidence for boundary conditions for the DMC’s effectiveness.
Specifically, I find that the DMC is more effective at raising consumer recall awareness
for recall campaigns in which the perceived susceptibility to risk (i.e., those including
older products) is higher. As products age, consumers tend to be less aware of new
information related to their products’ safety. The findings indicate that the impact of the
DMC on consumer recall awareness is higher amongst consumers owning older vehicles.
I also find that the DMC is less effective at increasing compliance through heightening
consumer awareness for recall campaigns containing products that are the subject of
multiple active recalls; that is, for campaigns in which the affected consumers face
multiple recall requests for their products concurrently. This finding perhaps implies that
consumers might become habituated to or desensitized by multiple product recall
requests by government agencies. As a result, the DMC may not be able to fully
counteract this form of consumer fatigue. These insights are significant because of their
implications for policymaking.
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While these findings reassure regulatory agencies that the DMC is more effective
for recall campaigns that have a higher perceived susceptibility to risk, they also imply
that regulatory agencies should avoid initiating concurrent recalls for the same product, if
possible. Collectively, the findings should enable regulatory agencies to make compelling
cases to receive larger budgets for DMCs in the future.

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

Regulatory agencies introduce interventions with the goal of promoting and
protecting consumer welfare. Government interventions supporting public welfare are
comprised of pecuniary interventions (e.g., ones imposing higher taxes/penalties or
offering financial incentives) as well as nonpecuniary interventions (e.g., those focused
on educating or building awareness) (McEvoy and Stranlund 2010). Prior research has
investigated the efficacy of interventions targeted at decreasing the consumption of
unhealthy products, promoting preventive health screenings, and stimulating consumer
spending (Colchero et al. 2017; Shapiro and Slemrod 2003; Wallington et al. 2018). The
effectiveness of such interventions is often assessed by examining the extent to which
consumers comply with or respond to the proposed initiatives.
Prior research provides equivocal evidence for the effectiveness of pecuniary
interventions. For example, the imposition of higher taxes has been found to lower
purchases of bottled water, reduce purchases of drinks with sugar additives, and decrease
the prevalence of smoking, although with associated unintended consequences that may
drive consumers toward more dangerous products (Berck et al. 2016; Colchero et al.
2017; Wang, Smith, and Singh 2015). Relatedly, the “Click It or Ticket” campaign,
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intended to improve seat belt usage in automobiles and promote consumer safety, has
been shown to be successful (Solomon, Ulmer, and Preusser 2002). However, offering
consumers incentives to stimulate sales through initiatives such as the “Cash for
Clunkers” program (Li, Linn, and Spiller 2013; Mian and Sufi 2012) or drive consumer
spending through tax rebate programs (Shapiro and Slemrod 2003; Shapiro and Slemrod
2009) has been found to be generally ineffective.
Likewise, evidence from prior research assessing the efficacy of nonpecuniary
interventions is also inconsistent. For example, the impact of the Nutrition Labeling and
Education Act (NLEA) in altering consumers’ behaviors is somewhat nebulous.
Moorman (1996) found that the NLEA significantly increased consumers’ nutrition
information processing and comprehension, although information-sensitive consumers
did not report an increased use of nutrition information after its implementation.
Relatedly, Balasubramanian and Cole (2002) did not find any change in consumers’
consumption-related search and recall of nutrition information after the NLEA’s
enactment. Ringold (2002) summarizes the effects of government agency-initiated public
information campaigns across various contexts and even documents consumer responses
opposite to those intended in some situations.
The mixed evidence on the efficacy of regulator-initiated interventions (those
pecuniary and nonpecuniary in nature) documented in prior research is not satisfactory
from a knowledge advancement perspective and raises important questions about the
potential effectiveness of a regulator-initiated DMC. Is a regulator-initiated DMC
effective in improving consumer recall compliance? How does a DMC improve
compliance? When is a DMC more or less effective?
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To answer these questions, I develop a conceptual framework by drawing on
insights from the health belief model (HBM) and health warning streams of research.1
Figure 1.1 presents the conceptual framework for the study. The HBM’s conceptual
origins are in the public health domain and it contends that in order for individuals to take
action to prevent a detrimental outcome, they need a) a cue or a trigger (internal or
external) to overcome their avoidance tendencies, b) to believe that they are susceptible
to its risk, c) to perceive that the occurrence of the outcome would have negative
consequences for them, and d) to believe that taking preventative action would lead to
benefits outweighing the barriers of cost, convenience, pain, and embarrassment
(Bowman, Heilman, and Seetharaman 2004; Janz and Becker 1984; Moorman and
Matulich 1993; Rosenstock 1974). Based on these insights in the public health context,
my framework considers the role of a) an awareness cue, b) the perceived susceptibility
to risk, and c) the perceived threat of noncompliance in eliciting consumer compliancerelated behaviors.2 The perceived time inconvenience of compliance is a control variable
in this framework, a choice guided by its relevance in this context. Given the personal
risk of operating a defective product, I believe that time-related inconvenience is not a
key consideration for consumers. For a “high hazard” issue, consumers are unlikely to
consider the associated time-related inconvenience of remedying the defect as a key
factor. For “low hazard” defects, consumers may ignore them altogether. In this context,

1

I note that Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and the Health Belief Model (HBM)
have similar conceptual underpinnings. However, while PMT has been used to
understand consumer responses to varying message appeals, the HBM is better suited for
understanding consumer non-compliance issues.
2
In this context, the barriers of cost, pain, and embarrassment are less relevant than they
are in medical contexts. Therefore, I focus on the time investment needed from
individuals to comply, a contributor to inconvenience.
8

time-related inconvenience is also not an ongoing issue as it is in the health domain,
where patients often frequently visit doctors to address their ailments.
Prior research on consumer responses to persuasive public health appeals suggests
that increasing the frequency of health warnings might desensitize consumers to the
potential hazard, resulting in either inaction or actions that are opposite to what the
warning intended (Stewart and Martin 1994; Ringold 2002). In my context, government

regulators, retailers, manufacturers and consumer experts are concerned that product
recalls have become so frequent across a range of goods, including food, consumer
products, and cars, that the public is suffering from “recall fatigue” (Layton 2010).
Therefore, it is imperative to consider the impact of multiple different warnings on a
consumer’s compliance to a request.
As seen in Figure 1.1, in my context, a DMC is conceptualized as the awareness
cue that is intended to overcome consumer inertia and elicit consumer recall compliance.
A DMC is typically comprised of paid search and online display advertisements. I
propose that a regulator-initiated DMC is likely to positively impact consumer recall
compliance. Further, I propose that this relationship is mediated by consumer recall
awareness through paid search. To identify moderators/boundary conditions for a DMC’s
effectiveness, I focus on factors that enhance or diminish the ability of consumers to
respond to a DMC and comply with a recall request following heightened consumer
recall awareness through paid search.
A DMC could lead to higher consumer recall compliance because of two distinct
possibilities. First, it is plausible that consumers are enabled to comply with a recall
request by being made aware of relevant information because of a DMC. These

9

consumers likely have an idea of how susceptible their products are to recall-related risk,
which leads them to search for information. Thus, I include the perceived susceptibility to
risk, a factor identified in the HBM, as a moderator of a DMC’s effectiveness on paid
search traffic (consumer recall awareness through paid search). Second, it is also likely
that, overall, consumers are more or less motivated to comply after recall-related
information is made more easily available by a DMC. Accordingly, I include the
perceived threat of noncompliance, a factor identified in the HBM literature, and the
presence of concurrent recall campaigns, a factor akin to multiple or frequent health
warnings that could potentially lead to diminished compliance, as moderators of the
DMC-generated paid search traffic’s effectiveness on increasing recall completion rates
(consumer recall compliance) (Stewart and Martin 1994; Ringold 2002).
As illustrated in Figure 1.1, I propose that perceived susceptibility to risk
positively moderates the impact of a DMC on consumer recall awareness created through
paid search advertisements specifically. This expectation is guided by the fact that paid
search ads capitalize on uninformed consumers actively searching for recall-related
information. In contrast, online display ads are generally perceived to be obtrusive
because of privacy concerns and they are often not proximate to a consumer’s interests
(Goldfarb and Tucker 2011). One key factor that contributes to increased perceived risk
susceptibility for consumers is the age of their respective products. Owners of older
(versus newer) products are less likely to receive information directly from their
manufacturers because their products are outside of their warranty periods and/or the
products have changed ownership over time, hampering their manufacturers’
communication efforts. However, such less informed consumers are cognizant of their
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products’ greater perceived susceptibility to risk and therefore search for information to a
greater extent. The incremental value of paid search ads thus lies in directing such
consumers to recall lookup webpages where the relevant information is provided. The
marginal impact of a DMC is therefore expected to be higher for consumers with
products that are more susceptible to risk.
We also consider the impact of a DMC on consumer recall compliance through its
use of paid search advertisements, a tool typically employed by DMCs. I propose that the
impact of heightened consumer recall awareness through paid search on consumer recall
compliance is moderated by the perceived threat of noncompliance and the presence of
concurrent recall campaigns. The rationale for including these moderators following the
paid search traffic mediator stems from the fact that a consumer learns about the
perceived threat of noncompliance and the presence of concurrent recall campaigns for
his/her product only after being made aware of a personally relevant product recall. Thus,
these factors are pertinent only in explaining the consumer’s motivation to comply (or
not) with his/her recall request after being made aware of its existence. Thus, the
perceived threat of noncompliance and the presence of concurrent recall campaigns are
likely to moderate a DMC’s overall effect on consumer recall compliance.
Research Hypotheses
Prior research suggests that marketing campaigns can be effective at increasing
individuals’ compliance-related behaviors. For example, Wallington et al. (2018) showed
that the introduction of a mass media campaign was associated with increased consumer
information search, displayed by high click-through rates and more referrals to medical
centers. Relatedly, Zaitsu et al. (2018) found that patients were more likely to receive a
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first prescription of a treatment following a direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA)
campaign designed to educate and provide resources about health-related decisions. The
positive impact of advertising initiatives by firms may even spill over to the category
level, as Wosinska (2005) noted that advertising by a brand increased consumer drug
therapy compliance of its rival brands’ products. Similarly, a recent study in a DTCA
context suggests that an increase in erectile dysfunction drug advertising has a positive
effect on birth rates (Kim and KC 2019). It is worth noting, however, that the positive
effects of awareness campaigns documented in prior research are primarily the result of
initiatives by firms and not regulators. A notable exception is Dunlop et al.’s (2013) work
on the positive effect of Australian antismoking on individuals’ thoughts of quitting and
attempts to quit, although these effects only emerged over longer durations of advertising
exposure (Dunlop et al. 2013).
However, there are also reasons to believe that a marketing campaign may not be
as effective if it is initiated by a regulator. For example, Robinson and Killen (1997)
found that greater knowledge of cigarette package warning labels was actually associated
with a higher risk of smoking amongst adolescents. Within the same domain, Pechmann
et al. (2003) determined that fewer than half of the antismoking advertisements they
showed to adolescents increased their nonsmoking intentions compared with a control.
Relatedly, most analyses of the effectiveness of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media
Campaign in the U.S. reported no effects from the initiative (Hornik et al. 2008). In
certain cases, government-sponsored marketing messages may even work counter to the
intended goal. In a laboratory setting, Bushman and Stack (1996) found that information
campaigns highlighting the negative effects of violent television programs actually
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increased attraction to violent films, with an even stronger effect emerging when the U.S.
Surgeon General was the source of the information. Consumers could indeed be skeptical
about government-initiated awareness campaigns related to certain polarizing or
controversial issues. However, the preponderance of evidence for a positive effect
resulting from awareness campaigns leads us to hypothesize that the main effect of a
DMC on consumer recall compliance will be positive.
H1: A regulator-initiated DMC is likely to have a positive impact on the recall
completion rate (consumer recall compliance).
The Mediating Role of Consumer Recall Awareness
Although DMCs are typically comprised of paid search and online display ads,
paid search is generally more effective at raising consumer awareness because it is more
closely linked to a consumer’s goals. Advertising intermediaries (e.g., Google and Bing)
collaborate with firms to create sponsored search advertisements and drive traffic to the
firms’ websites (Dinner, Van Heerde, and Neslin 2014; Kronrod, Grinstein, and Wathieu
2012; Rutz and Bucklin 2011). Fundamentally, the value of paid search ads lies in
guiding consumers in need of information to the right location and preventing consumers
from abandoning their searches because of a lack of relevant information (Dinner, Van
Heerde, and Neslin 2014; Rutz and Bucklin 2011). Therefore, the utility of paid search
campaigns is greater in contexts where consumers have low levels of familiarity with the
firms’ brands or products (Blake, Nosko, and Tadelis 2015).
Past research has also demonstrated that consumer awareness of firms that
utilized paid search advertising increased during their marketing campaigns (Dai and
Luca 2016). Dinner, Van Heerde, and Neslin (2014) find that paid search advertising
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significantly impacts offline sales, highlighting that DMCs utilizing paid search could
impact downstream behaviors of consumers. In my context, I expect a regulator-initiated
DMC to increase consumer recall awareness by guiding consumers to the regulator’s
recall lookup webpage and providing pertinent information about recalls. The heightened
awareness, in turn, increases the likelihood of consumers to comply with their recall
requests. I therefore hypothesize that the impact of a DMC on consumer recall
compliance is mediated through consumer recall awareness.
H2: Paid search traffic (consumer recall awareness through paid search) is likely
to mediate the impact of a regulator-initiated DMC on the recall completion rate
(consumer recall compliance). A DMC is likely to be positively related to paid
search traffic. Paid search traffic is likely to be positively related to the recall
completion rate.
A Regulator-Initiated DMC’s Impact on Consumer Recall Awareness: The Moderating
Role of the Perceived Susceptibility to Risk
Consumers are in general more informed of product-related issues (i.e., defects,
failures) when they interact with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) during their
products’ warranty periods. As products age and their warranties expire, consumers’
interactions with OEMs tend to be less frequent. For instance, Rupp and Taylor (2002)
propose that owners of older products are less likely to schedule routine product
maintenance. Additionally, product ownership could also change as products age,
reducing the likelihood that notifications sent from the OEM will reach the consumer
who presently owns the product. While consumers owning older products are likely less
aware of their products’ recall-related defects, they also likely recognize that they are
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more susceptible to recall-related risks than owners of newer products. Perceived risk
susceptibility is likely to be lower for consumers who own newer products because the
expected life of those products is higher (Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1994; Rupp and
Taylor 2002). Therefore, the impact of a DMC providing product-specific recall-related
information is likely to be stronger for consumers who are more susceptible to recallrelated risk. I expect consumers with greater perceived susceptibility to risk to search and
click on paid search advertising to a greater extent than consumers with lower perceived
susceptibility to risk. Consumers who own newer products and interact more frequently
with OEMs are therefore less likely to independently search for recall information.
Accordingly, I hypothesize that the impact of a DMC on consumer recall awareness will
be greater when the product’s perceived susceptibility to risk is higher.
H3: The age of the recalled model (perceived susceptibility to risk) positively
moderates the impact of a regulator-initiated DMC on paid search traffic
(consumer recall awareness through paid search) such that the impact is stronger
when the age of the recalled model is greater.
A Regulator-Initiated DMC’s Impact on Consumer Recall Compliance: The
Moderating Role of the Perceived Threat of Noncompliance
Previous research provides robust evidence for a positive relationship between the
perceived threat of noncompliance and consumer recall compliance. Leavitt (1979) finds
that a consumer’s perception of threat is the most influential determinant of whether
he/she seeks medical care services. Similarly, consumers are more likely to comply to
prescribed treatment regimens when they perceive that noncompliance would threaten
their well-being (Bowman, Heilman, and Seetharaman 2004). Relatedly, vehicle owners
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are more likely to repair defective products when the perceived threat of noncompliance
is higher. Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly (1994) provide evidence that consumers remedy more
severe defects at higher rates than less severe defects. In general, consumers appear more
motivated to comply with actions that prevent future harm for issues that are more
dangerous once they are made aware of the danger. In other words, awareness is a
necessary precursor to action. Therefore, I posit that the impact of heightened consumer
recall awareness through paid search will be higher when the perceived threat of
noncompliance is higher.
H4: The component’s hazard rating (perceived threat of noncompliance)
positively moderates the impact of a paid search traffic (consumer recall
awareness through paid search) on the recall completion rate (consumer recall
compliance) such that the impact is stronger when the component hazard is
greater.
A Regulator-Initiated DMC’s Impact on Consumer Recall Compliance: The
Moderating Role of Concurrent Recall Campaigns
The rationale for examining concurrent recall campaigns as a moderator stems
from previous research which suggests that repeated exposure to product warnings might
result in consumers getting habituated or even developing psychological reactance to
warning messages (Brehm 1966; Garretson and Burton 1998; Stewart and Martin 1994).
Relatedly, some consumers may be skeptical of these repeated product warnings from
government information campaigns (Ringold 2002). In such situations, consumers might
ignore safety warnings as they begin to perceive messages by regulatory agencies seeking
compliance as less credible or even coercive.
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Prior literature has shown that the detrimental effect of warning messages is
particularly damaging for individuals who are frequent users of products that receive
them (Garretson and Burton 1998). Accordingly, the potential for not acting on a product
recall request after being made aware of it is likely to be higher for consumers facing
multiple recall notices for their product relative to consumers facing a single recall. Given
that a DMC in this setting is regulator-initiated, concurrent recall campaigns for the same
product could desensitize consumers, making them more likely to ignore recall requests
and not thereby comply. I therefore hypothesize that after consumers are informed about
concurrent recall campaigns through their paid search activities, concurrent campaigns
for the same product will negatively moderate a DMC’s impact on compliance.
H5: Concurrent recall campaigns negatively moderate the impact of paid search
traffic (consumer recall compliance through paid search) on the recall
completion rate (consumer recall compliance) such that the impact is weaker for
products involved in concurrent recall campaigns.

Research Methodology

The empirical setting for this study is the automobile industry in the United
States, which is both economically significant and empirically appealing. The automobile
industry is a significant cog in the U.S. economy, representing approximately 3.5% of the
gross domestic product. Product recalls are regulated by the NHTSA and several of the
characteristics of this setting make it attractive for exploring my research objectives.
First, safety is highly regulated and manufacturers are mandated to periodically report
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progress on product recall campaigns. Importantly, longitudinal data on recall completion
rates is publicly available, thereby facilitating a systematic investigation of recall
compliance by consumers over time. Second, because of the automobile industry’s
prominent role in the economy, government initiatives or programs to stimulate
consumption or regulate consumer safety are quite common (e.g., the “Cash for
Clunkers” program and the “Click It or Ticket” initiative). The NHTSA’s January of
2016 launch of the “Safe Cars Save Lives” campaign, its first nationwide DMC to
improve consumer recall compliance, provides us with a fertile empirical context to test
my predictions.
The “Safe Cars Save Lives” Campaign
In 2014, the U.S. automobile industry experienced the largest product recall in its
history. The NHTSA received notification from several automobile manufacturers that
they were conducting recalls to address a possible safety defect
involving Takata airbag inflators. The concern was that the defective airbags were at risk
of rupturing violently following a collision, hurling fiery shrapnel into drivers and
passengers. Reports indicated that in addition to fatalities, hundreds of drivers had been
injured. The scope of the scandal escalated sharply in the following months, leading to a
record-breaking 63 million vehicles recalled in 2014 and 51 million in 2015.
Against this backdrop, the NHTSA launched its first nationwide digital marketing
campaign, “Safe Cars Save Lives,” in January of 2016. Even though the NHTSA’s DMC
was motivated by the Takata airbag inflator recall issue, the campaign was a part of the
agency’s effort to improve the dismal completion rates for all recalls. Lamenting low
recall completion rates, the U.S. Transportation Secretary noted that informed consumers
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were “allies” in improving recall compliance (EDriving 2016). The DMC was a full
coverage initiative that all consumers in the United States were exposed to in 2016 and
2017. “Safe Cars Save Lives” sought to aggressively push consumers to use the
NHTSA’s recall lookup webpage, check for open recalls, and fix defective vehicles in a
timely manner.
The DMC utilized paid search advertisements to influence recall completion rates.
A key part of the campaign was the use of Google AdWords to target consumers
searching for recall-related information online through keywords such as “Vehicle
Recalls,” “Check for Recalls,” and “Is My Vehicle Recalled,” among others. In addition,
the NHTSA used display advertising on media platforms such as Facebook to educate
consumers about the dangers of ignoring open recalls. Between January of 2016 and
March of 2017, the NHTSA spent approximately $1 million on sponsored advertisements
on Google, Facebook, and other platforms (GAO 2017).
Data Sources and Measures
We assembled the data from a variety of sources. The unit of analysis for the
study is the recall campaign-year-quarter. The NHTSA maintains a database that includes
every vehicle safety recall campaign that has been issued from 1966 onward. A typical
recall campaign notice provides information on the vehicle makes and models affected,
the number of units recalled, the nature of the defect, and the date of the recall’s
announcement.
The data on the recall completion rate, the dependent measure, was sourced from
the NHTSA’s database. The NHTSA mandates that manufacturers provide quarterly
updates on the number of affected vehicles remedied and the total number of vehicles
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affected by recalls. These updates allow the NHTSA to monitor recall completion on an
ongoing basis. Typically, manufacturers are expected to provide recall completion
updates for six to eight quarters after a recall is initiated. Specifically, manufacturers
report the number of vehicles remedied since the last update and these reports are
aggregated by unique recall identification numbers. I also collected data from the
NHTSA on individual recall characteristics such as the age of the recalled car models, the
defective component in the vehicles, the estimated time needed to complete the repair,
and the number of recall notifications sent to consumers. In addition, I gathered data from
LexisNexis on the number of press articles about a recall campaign from the time the
recall was initiated to three months afterwards to capture the media coverage surrounding
a recall. Table 1.1 presents variables, measures, and data sources for the study.
Additionally, I collected make-level advertising and sales data from Kantar’s
ad$pender database and Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, respectively. Since the goal of
the study is to examine the effectiveness of the DMC launched in January of 2016, I only
included recall campaigns in the sample if they were “affected” by the DMC, i.e.,
campaigns active both before and after the DMC began for which there is recall
completion data. Accordingly, I did not include recall campaigns which ended before the
DMC began or were announced after the DMC began in my sample. Thus, the final
sample for my main specification includes a panel data set of 296 recall campaigns in the
United States automobile industry from 2015 to 2017 for 56 different makes, totaling
1,809 observations.
Dependent measure. I operationalize “Consumer Recall Compliance,” the
dependent measure, as the recall completion rate for individual recall campaigns: the
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ratio of the number of recalled vehicles remedied in a given quarter to the total number of
vehicles affected by a recall. For example, if, in a certain quarter, a recall campaign had
10,000 vehicles remedied out of the 100,000 affected by the recall, the recall completion
rate would be 10%. The dependent measure thus captures recall completion on a
quarterly basis. Importantly, the dependent measure only varies across individual recall
campaigns and across time. For example, within the same recall campaign, two different
makes may be affected (i.e., automobiles produced by Honda and Acura that may share a
common defective component), meaning that the dependent measure does not vary at the
make level, but rather, at the campaign level. Similarly, each recall campaign focuses on
a defective component, which means that there is no component level variation within the
same recall campaign.
Measures for moderator variables. In my empirical context, a consumer’s
perception of a vehicle’s susceptibility to risk increases as the age of the vehicle
increases. I thus operationalize the “Perceived Susceptibility to Risk” using the “Age of
Recalled Model” variable, calculated as the number of years elapsed between the
manufacturing year of the oldest recalled model in a recall campaign and the calendar
quarter for which I observe the recall campaign’s recall completion rate. For example,
consider a recall campaign announced in June of 2014 featuring two vehicle models
manufactured in June of 2012 and September of 2013. “Age of the Recalled Model”
during the first quarter of the recall campaign would be coded as two years, since the
June of 2012 model is the oldest in the recall campaign. In September of 2014 (the
following quarter), “Age of Recalled Model” would equal 2.25 years.
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To operationalize the “Perceived Threat of Noncompliance,” I used the NHTSA’s
database to identify the defective component in each recall campaign and past literature
to determine the hazard rating of each component. Consumers are informed of the nature
of their vehicle’s defect in the recall notification letter they receive. Extant literature has
classified recalls into two categories based on the hazard or severity of the issue (Bae and
Benítez-Silva 2011; Bae and Benítez-Silva 2013; Hoffer, Pruitt, and Reilly 1994; Rupp
2001; Rupp and Taylor 2002). Consistent with past research, I operationalize the
“Perceived Threat of Noncompliance” as a dummy variable by classifying defective
components associated with the driving functionality of a vehicle (i.e., those that could
result in a loss of vehicle control due to acceleration, steering or braking, frame
corrosion, fire, or repeated stalling) as “high hazard” (coded as “1”) and all other
components that are not directly related to the drivability of a vehicle as “low hazard”
(coded as “0”). A non-exhaustive list of examples of components and their hazard levels
is reported in Table 1.2. The perceived threat of noncompliance is likely to be higher
when defective components are highly hazardous.
To identify concurrent recall campaigns, I examined active recalls to determine if
vehicles of the same make-model-year whose dates of production overlapped were
involved in multiple simultaneous recalls during my observation window. For example, I
used the NHTSA’s database to check if 2015 Toyota Camry vehicles experienced
multiple active recalls. Owners of these vehicles could potentially exhibit fatigue as a
result of having to remedy multiple issues for the same vehicle. I operationalize
“Concurrent Recall Campaigns” by coding recall campaigns including vehicles involved
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in concurrent recall campaigns as “1” and all other recall campaigns that did not include
vehicles involved in concurrent recalls as “0.”
Measure for the mediator. To operationalize “Consumer Recall Awareness
through Paid Search,” the hypothesized mediator, I collected data on the paid search
traffic to the NHTSA’s recall lookup webpage as a result of the DMC using SEMrush
Analytics, a leading vendor that provides a competitive research service on online
marketing and advertising. SEMrush uses a crawler to scrape Google search results and
maintains search positions for roughly 40 million keyword phrases in a database. For
those keywords, the search traffic data is estimated from the behavior of over 200 million
real Internet users. I collected data on the total number of paid search visitors to the
NHTSA’s recall lookup webpage for every quarter in the data period. It is worth noting
that although the NHTSA’s DMC was launched in January of 2016, the agency was
running paid search campaigns in 2015 for other non-DMC-related safety issues,
including how to install car seats for infants. Additionally, the NHTSA had purchased
recall-related keywords in 2015, although not as part of a DMC. While paid search traffic
data is analyzed from quarter one of 2015 to quarter four of 2017, only paid search traffic
in the quarters following January of 2016 reflects the NHTSA’s DMC. All paid search
traffic during the DMC is a result of the DMC. The mean quarterly paid search traffic in
the post-DMC period is 48,770 visitors.
Measures for control variables. I first outline the rationale for including the
control variables before discussing their operational measures. In line with the HBM
stream of research, I control for the “Perceived Time Inconvenience of Compliance,” a
potential consideration for consumers when electing to comply with a recall notice. In
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addition to the DMC, make-level advertising could impact consumer recall awareness
and therefore consumer recall compliance. For example, increased advertising by firms,
particularly in the post-DMC period, could cue consumers to pay attention to product
recall requests and increase recall completion. Accordingly, I include a make-level
“Advertising Intensity” variable in my specification to control for firm efforts to increase
general awareness. Additionally, although automakers are mandated to notify consumers
about a product recall, in some cases, they issue more than one notification to consumers.
Given that multiple notifications could increase recall completion rates, I include the
variable “Multiple Recall Notifications” to control for this possibility. Further, mass
media outlets like newspapers are a unique voice in the marketplace and provide
consumers with information that is different from communication initiated by firms or
governmental agencies (Chen et al. 2019). Thus, publicity around specific recall
campaigns could also cue consumers to comply, a possibility I account for by including
the variable “Media Coverage” in my empirical specification.
We operationalize the “Perceived Time Inconvenience of Compliance” as the
estimated time needed for the defective component to be repaired (in hours) provided in
recall notification letters, represented by the “Time for Repair” variable.3 I note that the
time required for fixing the defect by the dealer is an estimate and the actual time taken
could be quite different. As the time required to remedy the defect increases, consumers
are likely to perceive remedying the defect as more inconvenient timewise. I use

3

It is possible that the distance of the nearest affiliated dealership to the consumer and
the actual time taken by the dealerships available to remedy recalls in the consumer’s
geographical region capture the perceived time inconvenience of compliance more
effectively.
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advertising expenses data from Kantar’s ad$pender database at the make level (and
normalize it by make sales in units using Ward’s Automotive Yearbook) to account for
automaker efforts at increasing make awareness and make-specific fixed effects to
account for differences in recall completion rates across makes. In addition, I also use a
dummy variable to operationalize “Multiple Recall Notifications” based on whether
consumers were notified by the manufacturer about a recall more than once. I
operationalize “Media Coverage” as the count of the number of articles in leading news
publications that covered a recall campaign up to three months after it was initiated.
Lastly, I use quarterly calendar fixed effects to control for temporal differences in recall
completion rates.

Model Specification

We ground my empirical specification in the interrupted time series analysis
(ITSA) framework, a technique commonly used to evaluate the effectiveness of
universally adopted or implemented policies. ITSA is a quasi-experimental design
typically used to assess the longitudinal effects of interventions with observational data
where full randomization, or a case-control design, is not possible. Its primary advantage
is that it exploits the longitudinal nature of the data and accounts for pre-intervention
trends (Bliese and Lang 2016; Kontopantelis et al. 2015; Singer and Willett 2003;
Wagner et al. 2002). I next briefly outline the intuition behind the ITSA framework.
ITSA is implemented using a regression model that includes three time-based
covariates: 1) time, 2) a post-intervention dummy, and 3) time since intervention. The
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regression coefficient associated with “Time” captures the natural trend in the outcome
before the intervention begins, while the coefficient for “Post-Intervention Dummy”
reflects how much the outcome changes, on average, in the one time period immediately
following the start of the intervention compared to the one time period immediately
preceding the intervention. Essentially, it represents a change in the intercept between the
pre- and post-intervention slopes of the dependent variable. The coefficient associated
with “Time since Intervention” captures the average relative change in the slope of the
dependent variable in the post-intervention time periods over and above its preintervention trend (represented by the “Time” variable). Accordingly, the coefficient
associated with “Time since Intervention” variable captures the effect of the intervention
over time. The key identifying assumption of ITSA is that in the absence of an
intervention, the natural trend in the outcome (“Time”) would remain unchanged in the
post-intervention period (Bliese and Lang 2016; Kontopantelis et al. 2015; Singer and
Willett 2003; Wagner et al. 2002).
Consistent with the ITSA framework, I argue that the recall completion rate is a
linear function of “Time from Recall,” “Post-DMC Dummy,” and “Time since DMC
Start.” “Time from Recall” captures the natural trend in recall completion rates before the
DMC. “Post-DMC Dummy” represents the difference in recall completion rates between
quarter four of 2015 and quarter one of 2016 (when the DMC began). “Time since DMC
Start” captures the effectiveness of the DMC as the relative change in the slope of the
recall completion rate, over and above its pre-DMC slope, in the post-DMC period. I
augment my basic specification with several control variables to rule out recall campaignspecific or make-specific alternative explanations.
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To aid my analyses, I constructed the aforementioned ITSA variables as follows.
“Time from Recall” is operationalized as the number of quarters elapsed since each recall
campaign began. “Post-DMC Dummy” captures whether an observation was in the time
period during which the DMC was active. The post-DMC dummy variable was coded as
“1” for all observations during the DMC (quarter one of 2016 and onward) and “0” for
observations before the DMC (observations in quarters one through four of 2015). “Time
since DMC Start” is operationalized as the number of quarters elapsed since the
NHTSA’s DMC began in January of 2016. This variable was coded “0” for all
observations before 2016.
In summary, the empirical model controls for various make-level, recall
campaign-level, and time-specific factors that could impact recall completion. I use ITSA
to establish the main effect of the DMC on consumer recall compliance before adding the
hypothesized mediating and moderating variables in a subsequent section. Based on the
above discussion, the empirical specification that I take to the data is as follows:
(1)

Recall Completion = β 0 + β1 Time from Recall it + β2 Post-DMC Dummy t
Rate it

+ β3 Time since DMC Start t + β4 Time for Repair i
+ β5 Advertising Intensity mt
+ β6 Multiple Recall Notifications i
+ β7 Media Coverage i + β8-63 Make m + β64-66 Quarter t + ε it

where “i” refers to a recall campaign, “t” refers to time (by quarter), “m” denotes a
vehicle make, and “” refers to the random error. Thus, my empirical specification, rooted
in the ITSA framework, attempts to quantify the effect of the NHTSA’s nationwide DMC
while accounting for several factors.
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Results

Descriptives
Table 1.3 presents the summary statistics for the variables. Approximately 61% of
the observations appear in the period during which the NHTSA’s DMC was active
(January of 2016 onward). The mean age of the oldest model in each recall campaign is
3.51 years, with vehicle ages ranging from less than a month to 19.06 years old. The
mean estimated time for repair completion is 1.88 hours, with a few defective
components requiring as much as 13 hours to remedy. The mean hazard rating of the
components involved in a recall campaign is .19. While there is a wide range for the
advertising intensity of different vehicle makes, the mean is .98. That is, approximately a
dollar is spent on advertising for every unit sold.
As mentioned before, the coefficient for the time since DMC start variable in my
empirical model captures the DMC’s (in)effectiveness over time on a quarterly basis.
This variable represents the relative change in the slope of the recall completion rate, on
average, over and above its pre-DMC slope. To provide model free evidence for the
DMC’s impact, I calculated the mean quarterly change in the dependent variable between
adjacent quarters in the periods before and after the DMC was introduced. I find that the
average quarterly change in recall completion rates is -3.56% in the pre-DMC period
and -2.13% in the post-DMC period, indicative of an improvement in the average recall
completion rate of 1.43% per quarter after the DMC was launched.
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Results for the Main Effect of the DMC on Consumer Recall Compliance (Hypothesis
1)
Table 1.4 reports the results of the main effect of the DMC on consumer recall
compliance using interrupted time series analysis. I note that the results reported in this
analysis pertain to 296 recall campaigns involving non-airbag inflator-related issues. I
exclude airbag inflator-related campaigns from this sample to avoid a potential
endogeneity issue arising because of the NHTSA’s unobserved efforts to improve the
recall completion rates of those campaigns specifically. Details regarding this potential
endogeneity are reported in the following section.
The results for the full model (Model 5) in Table 1.4 reveal that the coefficient for
the impact of “Time from Recall” on recall completion is negative (-5.39, p<.01). The
finding implies that consumer recall compliance decreases by 5.39% per quarter, on
average, prior to the start of the DMC. The coefficient for the post-DMC dummy variable
is negative (-7.20, p<.01), indicating that relative to quarter four of 2015, the recall
completion rate decreased by 7.20% in quarter one of 2016. This negative intercept
between the pre- and post-DMC recall completion rate slopes (i.e., lower recall
completion in quarter one of 2016 relative to quarter four of 2015) is perhaps the result of
dealerships being inundated with fulfilling recall requests for airbag inflator-related
campaigns in the first quarter of 2016. The primary motivation for the DMC, as noted
before, was to improve recall completion of airbag-related recall campaigns. As a result,
dealerships likely experienced pressure to fix airbag-related defects as soon as the DMC
was initiated, hampering their ability to fix vehicles with non-airbag-related issues in the
first quarter of 2016.
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My main interest, however, is in “Time since DMC Start,” which represents the
average relative change in the slope of the recall completion rate in the post-DMC period
from quarter two of 2016 onward. The results in Table 1.4 indicate that the coefficient for
“Time since DMC Start” is positive (2.58, p<.01), implying that after the DMC’s launch,
the recall completion rate increased, on average, by 2.58% per quarter relative to the preDMC rate. The net effect of the DMC across the eight quarters I observe is a 10.86%
improvement in consumer recall compliance: the sum of the drop in the recall completion
rate in quarter one of 2016 (-7.20%) and the seven quarters of subsequent improvement
in the recall completion rate (7 x 2.58%).
Further, as expected, the main effect of the advertising intensity variable is
positive (.02, p<.01), indicating that as make-level advertising intensity increases,
consumer recall compliance also increases. The time for repair, multiple recall
notifications, and media coverage variables are not significant (p>.25). Using ITSA, I
find evidence of the positive main effect of the NHTSA’s DMC on consumer recall
compliance, supporting H1. In the following section, I validate the DMC’s effect using
nearest-neighbor matching estimates.
Potential Endogeneity because of Airbag Inflator-Related Recall Campaigns
An important issue to consider in my analyses is the fact that the NHTSA’s DMC
might not be exogenous, as it was introduced in the wake of Takata airbag inflator-related
recalls. However, it is critical to note that even though Takata airbag recalls served as the
backdrop for the introduction of the DMC in January of 2016, the initiative was an
NHTSA effort to tackle the problem of low recall completion rates in general (Edmunds
2014). Nonetheless, one could argue that the NHTSA’s sensitization with the Takata
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airbag inflator issues not only led to the DMC, but also effectuated unobserved efforts in
the post-DMC period. For instance, the NHTSA conducted a string of door-to-door visits
in humid areas in which the incidence of airbag inflator ruptures was expected to be
higher and whose consumers were difficult to reach using traditional communication
methods (Plungis 2017). This introduces an endogeneity problem related to omitted
variables in the regression model, as these omitted NHTSA efforts get subsumed in the
error term. The DMC could thus be correlated with the error term, resulting in the DMC’s
effectiveness getting upward biased. Because the unobserved effort was expended on
only airbag inflator-related campaigns, removing these campaigns from the analysis
allows us to circumvent the issue of endogeneity. Therefore, I only focused on nonairbag-related recall campaigns to test the impact of the NHTSA’s DMC on recall
compliance.
To test if the inclusion of airbag inflator-related recalls indeed upwardly biases
my estimates, I re-estimate the DMC’s effect on an expanded sample by including recall
campaigns related to faulty airbag inflators, the key issue for defective Takata airbags.
The sample size with both airbag inflator-related and non-airbag-related campaigns is
comprised of 1,902 observations spanning 311 recall campaigns (i.e., 15 airbag inflatorrelated and 296 non-airbag-related campaigns). I create a dummy variable, “Airbag,” that
is coded “1” if the recall campaign is airbag inflator-related and “0” otherwise. In
addition, I include an interaction term between the time since DMC start and airbag
variables to check if the DMC’s effects are stronger for airbag inflator-related recall
campaigns than non-airbag-related recall campaigns. If my intuition about the DMC’s
endogeneity is correct, then the coefficient for the interaction term between the time since
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DMC start and the airbag dummy variables should be positive. The results of this
analysis on the combined airbag inflator and non-airbag sample are reported in Table 1.5.
In line with my intuition, the coefficient for the interaction term is positive (3.28, p<.01),
implying that recall campaigns targeting airbag inflator-related issues experienced a
3.28% relative quarterly improvement in the recall completion rate, on average, over and
above non-airbag-related campaigns following the NHTSA’s DMC.
This analysis thus supports my assumption that the endogeneity of the NHTSA’s
DMC due to airbag inflator-related recall campaigns could upward bias the estimates.
The empirical approach of dropping the airbag inflator-related campaigns from the main
analyses alleviates concerns about the endogeneity of the NHTSA’s DMC.
Validation of the Main Effect using Nearest-Neighbor Matching Estimates
To demonstrate that the improvement I detect in consumer recall compliance
because of the DMC is not sensitive to ITSA’s methodological assumptions, I test the
DMC’s effectiveness using nearest-neighbor matching estimates. Nearest-neighbor
matching is often used in quasi-experimental settings in which there is a “treatment” that
impacts one group (the treatment group) while another group is left unaffected (the
control group). To estimate the treatment effect, units in the treatment group are matched
with similar units in the control group based on the covariates of interest (Gill, Sridhar,
and Grewal 2017; Stuart 2010). In my context, I match recall campaign observations
based on their “nearest neighbors,” determined by a distance metric computed based on
covariates I used in the ITSA specification. While ITSA relies on detecting the change in
the recall completion rate’s slope after the DMC is introduced amongst the same recall
campaigns, nearest-neighbor matching does not evaluate the change in the dependent
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variable’s slope to ascertain the DMC’s effectiveness. Instead, nearest-neighbor matching
compares the recall completion rates between observations in the “treatment” and
“control” groups.
To create treatment and control groups, I expanded the original sample of recall
campaigns by gathering additional data from the NHTSA’s database. I code recall
campaigns active before the DMC (prior to January of 2016) into the “control” group
(since they did not receive the DMC “treatment”) and recall campaigns active during the
DMC (from quarter one of 2016 to quarter four of 2017) into the “treatment” group. I
match recall campaign observations by determining their closest “empirical twin” based
on Mahalonobis distance (i.e., a weighted function of their covariates) (Abadie et al.
2004). I use exact matching for two variables: “Time from Recall” and “Multiple Recall
Notifications.” The rationale for exact matching on the time from recall variable is to
compare observations from recall campaigns that have been active for the same amount
of time. For instance, a “treated” observation from a recall campaign that has elapsed two
quarters (i.e., “Time from Recall” equals “2”) is matched with a “control” observation
from a recall campaign that has been active for the same amount of time (i.e., “Time from
Recall” equals “2”). Likewise, I exactly match observations from “treated” recall
campaigns whose manufacturers sent multiple recall notifications with “control” recall
campaigns that were also sent multiple recall notifications. The other variables I use for
matching are the those used in the ITSA specification. I do not include “Post-DMC
Dummy” and “Time since DMC Start” in the matching since the recall completion rate
comparison is not between the same recall campaigns. The final sample is comprised of
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2,161 observations (1,462 in the treatment group) from 707 recall campaigns (412 in the
treatment group).
We assess the quality of the matches by comparing the standardized differences of
the means of the variables before and after matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1985). I use
this criterion because it is not influenced by sample size (Austin 2009). As seen in Table
1.6, the absolute standardized differences between variables in the treatment and control
groups are below .20, indicating good balance (Rubin 2001; Stuart 2010). As reported in
Table 1.7, I find that the average treatment effect (ATE) of the DMC is 2.40 (p<.01).
That is, on average, the recall completion rate is 2.40% higher quarterly for recall
campaigns active during the DMC compared to recall campaigns active before the DMC.
The positive main effect of the DMC on consumer recall compliance using nearestneighbor matching provides corroboratory evidence that the effect documented using
ITSA is not sensitive to the method’s assumptions.
Testing for Mediation and Moderation
To formally test the remainder of the conceptual framework I present in Figure
1.1, I examine 1) the role of “Paid Search Traffic” as a mediating variable (hypothesis 2),
2) the impact of the “Age of the Recalled Model” as a moderating variable in the first
stage of the mediation model (hypothesis 3), and 3) the respective moderating effects of
the “Component Hazard” (hypothesis 4) and “Concurrent Recall Campaigns” (hypothesis
5) variables in the second stage of the model.
In line with the recommendations of Edwards and Lambert (2007), I estimate two
equations to test for the hypothesized mediation and moderation: one equation for the
mediating variable (“Paid Search Traffic”) and one for the dependent variable (the recall
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completion rate). Importantly, my conceptual framework aligns with PROCESS
modeling tool’s template 35. The average causal mediation effects are estimated using
procedures outlined by Tingley et al. (2014).
The equation for the mediating variable is as follows and its coefficients are
reported in Table 1.8:
(2)

Paid Search Traffic t = β 0 + β1 Time from Recall it + β2 Post-DMC Dummy t
+ β3 Time since DMC Start t + β4 Age of Recalled Model it
+ β5 Advertising Intensity mt
+ β6 Multiple Recall Notifications i + β7 Media Coverage i
+ β8 Time since DMC Start t x Age of Recalled Model it
+ εt

Equation 2 is used to test for the moderating role of the “Age of Recalled Model”
variable on “Paid Search Traffic.”
The equation for the dependent variable is as follows and its coefficients are
provided in Table 1.9:
(3)

Recall Completion = β 0 + β1 Time from Recall it + β2 Post-DMC Dummy t
Rate it

+ β3 Time since DMC Start t + β4 Age of Recalled Model it
+ β5 Paid Search Traffic t + β6 Component Hazard c
+ β7 Time for Repair i + β8 Advertising Intensity mt
+ β9 Organic Search Traffic t
+ β10 Multiple Recall Notifications i + β11 Media Coverage i
+ β12 Concurrent Recall Campaigns i
+ β13 Paid Search Traffic t x Component Hazard c
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+ β14 Paid Search Traffic t x Concurrent Recall Campaigns I
+ ε it
Equation 3 is used to test for the mediating role of “Paid Search Traffic” and the
moderating roles of “Component Hazard” and “Concurrent Recall Campaigns.” In the
above specification, “c” refers to the component needing repair.
The Mediating Role of Consumer Recall Awareness (Hypothesis 2). A key feature of the
NHTSA’s DMC was the utilization of paid search advertisements using Google
AdWords. I hypothesize that the DMC improved consumer recall compliance through
heightened consumer recall awareness, as reflected by higher DMC-related paid search
traffic to the NHTSA’s recall lookup webpage. In the case of a regulator-initiated DMC,
it is unclear whether consumers would click on a paid search ad to gather information.
This uncertainty stems from consumer skepticism of government-sponsored information
campaigns (Ringold 2002). Therefore, testing the impact of the DMC on consumer recall
awareness and the impact of consumer recall awareness on consumer recall compliance
validates a mechanism for the DMC’s positive effect.
The NHTSA bid on thousands of keywords to drive traffic to its recall lookup
webpage. Upon clicking a paid search advertisement, users were directed to the
NHTSA’s recall lookup webpage which enabled them to enter their vehicles’ identifying
information and gain access to resources on how to get the defect(s) fixed free of cost. As
mentioned previously, I collected data on the quarterly paid search traffic to the
NHTSA’s recall lookup webpage using SEMrush Analytics.
To formally test the mediating role of paid search traffic (i.e., consumer recall
awareness through paid search), I followed procedures advocated by past research
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(Tingley et al. 2014). Specifically, I estimate the average causal mediation effects using
equations 2 and 3. Table 1.8 reports the results for the equation for the “Paid Search
Traffic” mediating variable (equation 2) and Table 1.9 reports the results for the
dependent variable’s equation (equation 3).
The impact of “Time since DMC Start” on “Paid Search Traffic” is positive and
significant in Model 1 of Table 1.8 (.039; p<.01). Similarly, in Model 1 of Table 1.9, the
impact of the paid search traffic variable on the recall completion rate is positive and
significant (12.48, p<.01). The average causal mediation effect is positive and significant
(.48, p<.01), suggesting that the indirect effect of the DMC on consumer recall
compliance through heightened paid search traffic to the regulator’s recall lookup
webpage is significant, supporting H2. Importantly, this finding regarding increased paid
search traffic and its role in the NHTSA’s DMC resonates with the U.S. Government
Accountability Office’s (GAO) report to a U.S. Congressional Committee in December
2017, which stated that:
“According to NHTSA data, the awareness campaign resulted in consumers
performing 1.1 million recall searches through March 2017… NHTSA plans to
spend another $1.8 million on Safe Cars Save Lives from September 2017 through
September 2018 due to the campaign’s effectiveness in raising awareness about
auto recalls” (GAO 2017, p. 24).
Examining Moderating Effects (Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5)
As seen in Model 1 of Table 1.8, the coefficient of the interaction of the time
since DMC start and age of recalled model variables is positive (.003, p<.01), supporting
H3. The finding suggests that the DMC is more effective at increasing paid search traffic
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(i.e., consumer recall awareness through paid search) amongst recall campaigns for older
versus newer vehicles (i.e., those with a higher perceived susceptibility to risk).
I next turn to Model 1 of Table 1.9 to examine the moderation on the second stage
of the mediation model and test H4 and H5. The results reveal that the coefficient for the
interaction of the paid search traffic and component hazard variables is not significant,
meaning the relationship between heightened paid search traffic and increased recall
completion rates is not stronger when the component involved in the recall campaigns is
more hazardous. H4 is not supported. In support of H5, the coefficient for the interaction
of “Paid Search Traffic” and “Concurrent Recall Campaigns” in Model 1 of Table 1.9 is
negative and significant (-8.56, p<.05). This finding suggests that the impact of paid
search traffic on consumer recall compliance is lower for recall campaigns that feature
vehicles involved in concurrent recall campaigns. The implication is that perhaps
consumers experiencing concurrent recall campaigns are fatigued by NHTSA-mandated
repeated warning messages.

Discussion

Research Implications
This study offers insights on how a regulator-initiated digital marketing campaign
can improve consumer recall compliance. I show that greater consumer recall awareness
generated through paid search advertisements underlies the DMC’s positive effect on
consumer recall compliance. That is, greater awareness of the issue at hand and the
provision of pertinent information are critical in influencing consumers’ decisions to
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comply. Consistent with the online advertising literature (Goldfarb and Tucker 2011;
Lobschat, Osinga, and Reinartz 2017), I find that the DMC’s positive effect on consumer
recall compliance is mediated by heightened consumer recall awareness of active recalls.
Importantly, the DMC not only improves consumer recall awareness through paid search,
but also improves the offline behavior of consumers complying with recall requests by
visiting automotive dealerships. This insight is similar in spirit to findings from research
on the theory of planned behavior (TPB), which suggests that awareness often precedes
attitudes towards compliance and the intention to comply (Ajzen 1991).
We also find that the relationship between the DMC and consumer recall
awareness generated through paid search is stronger when the perceived susceptibility to
risk is higher (i.e., for older vehicles). This finding implies that search engine marketing
(SEM) is incrementally effective for uninformed consumers who are otherwise hard to
reach (Blake, Nosko, and Tadelis 2015). Finally, I find that the effect of the DMC on
consumer recall compliance is lower for recall campaigns containing products facing
concurrent recalls. This finding is consistent with literature which has found that
habituation and reactance are consumer motivational states that contribute to warning
messages not getting noticed or being ignored (Stewart and Martin 1994). If consumers
are exposed to warning messages repeatedly, they might become desensitized to the
possibility of danger and, as a result, fail to respond to appeals or messages (Duchon and
Laage 1986). Similarly, when consumers are exposed to concurrent recalls for their
vehicles, the DMC appears to be less effective at increasing compliance. The findings
should encourage future research examining the effectiveness of intervention-based
programs to pay attention to factors that could desensitize consumers.
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Public Policy Implications
This study’s findings also offer actionable insights for policymakers. Multiple
audit reports submitted to U.S. Congress in recent years have questioned the adequacy of
the NHTSA’s oversight processes in managing recall compliance (OIG 2018). The
overarching concern is that the agency has failed to carefully review safety issues, hold
automakers accountable, collect safety data, or adequately train its staff, resulting in
significant safety concerns being overlooked. Some industry experts go a step further and
lament that product recalls may actually increase the number of crashes on the road, as
the extra driving needed to remedy the issues heightens the probability of accidents
(McDonald 2009). My empirical analyses reveal that the DMC improved consumer recall
compliance by approximately 10.9% over its duration, a significantly positive outcome
for the NHTSA.
I quantify the economic significance of my findings by linking greater recall
compliance to a reduction in the number of vehicle accidents and the economic costs
associated with vehicle crashes. Previous research has shown that, on average, a one
percent improvement in recall compliance in the automobile industry lowers the number
of vehicle accidents in the next three years by .46% (see Bae and Benítez-Silva 2011, p.
858). Given that the DMC improved recall compliance by 5.45% on an annual basis, the
number of accidents for vehicles involved in recalls during the DMC is expected to
reduce by 2.51% in the following three years. Therefore, for an average-sized recall
campaign in the sample (74,000 vehicles), the DMC could prevent as many as 1,858
potential accidents over that time horizon (i.e., 74,000 x .0251). Past research by the
NHTSA suggests that the average economic costs (e.g., fatalities, non-fatal injuries, and
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damaged vehicles) associated with a motor vehicle accident are about $14,000 (Blincoe
et al. 2002). Therefore, the net economic impact of the DMC for an average-sized recall
campaign is potentially as high as $26 million. I submit that this figure is an upper-bound
for the DMC’s economic impact because a smaller percentage of vehicles with
unrepaired defects may be involved in crashes. Regardless, the last few years have
witnessed an average of 953 product recalls in the U.S. automobile industry, suggesting
that the total annual economic impact of improved consumer recall compliance across all
recall campaigns is far from trivial.
Further, my study implies that a lack of available relevant information is a
significant contributing factor to low consumer recall compliance. For years, the NHTSA
has sought to mandate electronic recall notices to counteract the issue of low consumer
recall awareness (Meier 2016). The regulatory agency’s foray into the digital domain
with “Safe Cars Save Lives” has proven successful, suggesting that increasing consumer
recall awareness is a crucial step in boosting recall completion rates. Even though the
automobile industry is prominent and receives considerable media attention (e.g.,
Toyota’s gas pedal issue, G.M.’s faulty ignition issue, and Takata airbag failures), getting
consumers to pay attention to product recall notifications is challenging.
This study also finds that the impact of the DMC on consumer recall compliance
through consumer recall awareness is stronger for product recall campaigns containing
products with higher perceived susceptibility to risk. Issues of low compliance are
particularly prevalent amongst owners of these older products. According to J.D. Power
(2016), just 44% of vehicles manufactured between 2003 and 2007 had their defects
remedied, drastically below recall completion rates of 73% for vehicles of model years
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2013 to 2017. In an NHTSA-organized meeting in 2018, federal and industry leaders
identified increasing compliance amongst owners of older vehicles as one of four key
topic areas to address moving forward (NHTSA 2018). The DMC’s effectiveness on
consumers owning older vehicles further suggests that regulators’ use of digital
marketing tools to communicate with such consumers could prove to be valuable.
Finally, my findings caution policymakers to be cognizant of consumer fatigue as
a serious impediment to recall compliance. While the DMC is generally effective at
eliciting the desired action from consumers, its effectiveness diminishes for recall
campaigns that include products facing concurrent recalls. Therefore, policymakers
seeking to improve recall compliance should consider minimizing the possibility of
hitting consumers with multiple recalls simultaneously. However, strategies seeking to
temporally space out product recalls in order to avoid bombarding consumers with
concurrent recall notices should also assess the associated risks. Collectively, the
evidence from my study should enable regulatory agencies to make more compelling
cases for the allocation of more financial resources devoted to initiatives seeking to
increase compliance.
Limitations and Future Directions
The findings of the study are subject to some limitations. First, the fact that the
study is limited to the U.S. automobile industry and a single DMC implies that caution is
warranted in generalizing the findings to other settings. However, the benefit of using
data from a focused campaign in one industry is that I can improve the internal validity of
the findings. More research is needed to understand whether DMCs are effective in
improving recall compliance in other settings and industries. If systematic recall
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completion data was available in other contexts and countries, the conceptual and
methodological framework employed in this study could be useful in deriving empirical
generalizations. Second, although my focus was on understanding the effectiveness of the
“Safe Car Save Lives” campaign, data on the total advertising expenditure by the
NHTSA on this campaign is not available. As such, the DMC’s positive effect should not
be interpreted as consumers’ responsiveness to advertising dollars. Third, more research
comparing the efficacy of regulators’ traditional and digital methods of communication is
needed to inform policy decisions regarding the right medium for agencies to notify
consumers about product safety issues.
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Table 1.1 Data Sources and Operationalization
Construct/Label
in Conceptual
Framework

Consumer Recall
Compliance

Measure

Recall
Completion Rate

Operationalization

The number of recalled vehicles
remedied in a given quarter
Recall Completion Rate divided by the total number of
vehicles affected by a recall.
Scaled by a factor of 100.

Data
Source(s)

Role in
Modeling

NHTSA

Dependent
variable

Time from Recall

The number of quarters elapsed
since a recall announcement has
been made for a recall campaign.

NHTSA

Explanatory
variable

Post-DMC Dummy

Coded “1” if the observation is
during or after the first quarter of
2016 and “0” otherwise.

NHTSA

Explanatory
variable

Time since DMC
Start

Time since DMC Start

The number of quarters elapsed
since the NHTSA’s digital
marketing campaign began.

NHTSA

Explanatory
variable

Age of Recalled
Model

Age of Recalled Model

The age, in years, of the oldest
model recalled in a recall
campaign at each respective

NHTSA

Moderator
variable
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Time from Recall
Announcement
Post-DMC
(Digital
Marketing
Campaign)

Perceived
Susceptibility to
Risk

Variable Name

recall completion rate report's
calendar quarter.

Perceived Threat
of
Noncompliance

Component
Hazard

Concurrent
Recall
Campaigns
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Perceived Time
Inconvenience of
Compliance

Time for Repair

Consumer Recall
Awareness
through Paid
Search

Paid Search
Traffic

Awareness Cues

Advertising
Intensity

Component Hazard

A binary measure of the hazard
of the defective component
identified in a recall campaign.
NHTSA
Components range from “0” (low
hazard) to “1” (high hazard).

Moderator
variable

Concurrent Recall
Campaigns

Coded “1” for recall campaigns
including vehicles involved in
concurrent recall campaigns.
Coded “0” otherwise.

NHTSA

Moderator
variable

Time for Repair

The estimated time, in hours,
needed for the dealer to complete
the recommended repair.

NHTSA

Control
variable

Paid Search Traffic

The number of visitors (in
hundreds of thousands) from
DMC-related paid search
advertisements to the NHTSA’s
recall lookup webpage.

SEMrush
Analytics

Mediator
variable

Advertising Intensity

Advertising expenses, in dollars,
normalized by make sales, in
units.

Kantar
ad$pender;
Ward's

Control
variable

Automotive
Yearbook

Awareness Cues
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Awareness Cues

Multiple Recall
Notifications

Media Coverage

Multiple Recall
Notifications

Coded “1” if the recalling firm
sent an additional recall
notification to consumers
affected by a recall campaign
above and beyond the mandatory
notification required by the
NHTSA. Coded “0” otherwise.

NHTSA

Control
variable

Media Coverage

The number of media mentions
for an individual recall campaign
beginning from the day of the
recall’s announcement until three
months afterwards.

LexisNexis

Control
variable

Table 1.2 Coding of Component Hazard
Component Hazard

Component
Airbags
Door Panel
Exterior Door Handle
Exterior Headlight Lighting
Fifth Wheel Latch
Hood Hinge and Attachments

0 (low hazard)

Information Placards/Labels
Interior Door Handle
Mounting Latch for Accessory Backrest
Parking Brake
Seat Belts
Sun Roof Assembly
Windshield Wipers
Braking
Driveline System and Axles
Electronic Stability Control
Engine
Fuel Ignition/Injection/Exhaust

1 (high hazard)

Power Steering
Power Train
Steering
Suspension
Tires
Wheel Assembly (e.g., Lug Nuts)
Wheels

47

Table 1.3 Descriptive Statistics
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Variable Name

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Number of
Observations

Recall Completion Rate
Time from Recall (number of quarters)
Post-DMC Dummy
Time since DMC Start (number of quarters)
Age of Recalled Model (in years)
Component Hazard
Concurrent Recall Campaigns
Time for Repair (in hours)
Advertising Intensity (in dollars/unit sales)
Multiple Recall Notifications
Media Coverage

12.42
2.57
.61
.95
4.09
.19
.35
1.88
.98
.03
.44

16.47
1.79
.49
1.32
3.51
.39
.48
2.11
9.51
.17
1.25

0
0
0
0
.04
0
0
0
0
0
0

100
9
1
7
19.06
1
1
13
208.86
1
10

1,809
1,809
1,809
1,809
1,655
1,809
1,809
1,809
1,785
1,809
1,809

Table 1.4 The Impact of the DMC on Consumer Recall Compliance: Main Effect Results

Dependent Variable: Recall
Completion Rate in %
Intercept

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Panel
Regression

Panel
Regression

Panel
Regression

Panel
Regression

Panel Regression
Full Model

Estimate
(Standard error)

Estimate
(Standard error)

Estimate
(Standard error)

Estimate
(Standard error)

Estimate
(Standard error)

11.31***

25.08***

27.07***

29.06***

26.11***

(.629)

(.938)

(.969)

(1.134)

(2.848)

***

Time from Recall
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-5.366

-4.211

-5.187

-5.393***

(.237)

(.279)

(.306)

(.317)

-6.021***

-7.598***

-7.196***

(.920)

(.954)

(.905)

2.330***

2.575***

(.323)

(.375)

Post-DMC Dummy

***

Time since DMC Start
Time for Repaira

-.077

-.116

-.078

-.104

-.086

(.098)

(.098)

(.092)

(.096)

(.118)

***

Advertising Intensity
Multiple Recall Notifications
Media Coverage

***

*

-.016

.005

-.005

.003

.018***

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.003)

(.007)

-1.210

.205

.320

.211

.265

(1.907)

(1.374)

(1.387)

(1.533)

(1.416)

.081

.368**

.394***

.337**

.241

Make Fixed Effects

(.268)
No

(.146)
No

(.140)
No

(.141)
No

(.212)
Yes

Quarter Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

N (sample size)

1,785

1,785

1,785

1,785

1,785

R-Squared Within

.00

.36

.37

.39

.39

R-Squared Between

.01

.13

.10

.11

.35

R-Squared Overall

.00

.34

.35

.37

.39

*

p < .10

**

p < .05

***
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a

p < .01

in hours

Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered on campaign

Table 1.5 Testing the DMC’s Endogeneity: Results from the Expanded Product Recall
Sample
Model 1
Panel Regression Full Model
Dependent Variable: Recall Completion
Rate in %
Intercept
Time from Recall
Post-DMC Dummy
Time since DMC Start
Airbag
Time since DMC Start x Airbag
Time for Repaira
Advertising Intensity
Multiple Recall Notifications
Media Coverage
Make Fixed Effects
Quarter Fixed Effects
N (sample size)
R-Squared Within
R-Squared Between
R-Squared Overall
*

Estimate
(Standard error)
25.73***
(2.830)
-5.215***
(.304)
-7.051***
(.870)
2.355***
(.366)
-7.348***
(1.620)
3.280***
(.628)
-.073
(.113)
.015*
(.008)
-.105
(1.207)
.189
(.203)
Yes
Yes
1,902
.38
.40
.38

p < .10
p < .05
***
p < .01
a
in hours
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered on campaign
**
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Table 1.6 Covariate Balance Before and After Matching

Variable

Standardized Differences

Variance Ratio

Raw

Matched

Raw

Matched

.018

-.175

1.839

.943

Advertising Intensity

-.058

-.028

.134

.413

Media Coverage

-.045

.016

1.151

1.532

Time for Repaira

Time from Recall

Exact Match

Multiple Recall Notifications

Exact Match

a

in hours
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Table 1.7 The Effect of the DMC on Consumer Recall Compliance: Average Treatment
Effect from Nearest-Neighbor Matching

Dependent Variable: Recall
Completion Rate in %

Estimate
(Standard error)

95% Confidence
Interval

2.402***
Average Treatment Effect

.627
(.906)
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4.178

Table 1.8 Results for Mediation Models: The Impact of the DMC on Consumer Recall
Awareness

Dependent Variable: Paid Search Trafficb
Intercept
Time from Recall
Post-DMC Dummy
Time since DMC Start
Age of Recalled Modelc
Advertising Intensity
Multiple Recall Notifications
Media Coverage
Organic Search Trafficb
Time since DMC Start x Age of Recalled Modelc
N (sample size)
R-Squared Overall
*

p < .10
p < .05
***
p < .01
b
in hundreds of thousands
c
in years
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered on campaign
**

54

Model 1
Estimate
(Standard error)
-0.220***
(0.012)
-0.010***
(0.001)
0.352***
(0.005)
0.039***
(0.006)
-0.002***
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.000)
-0.012
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.067***
(0.003)
0.003***
(0.001)
1,637
.83

Table 1.9 Results for Mediation Models: The Impact of the DMC on Consumer Recall
Compliance

Dependent Variable: Recall Completion Rate in %
Intercept
Time from Recall
Post-DMC Dummy
Time since DMC Start
Age of Recalled Modelc
Paid Search Trafficb
Component Hazard
Time for Repaira
Advertising Intensity
Organic Search Trafficb
Multiple Recall Notifications
Media Coverage
Concurrent Recall Campaigns
Paid Search Trafficb x Component Hazard
Paid Search Trafficb x Concurrent Recall Campaigns
N (sample size)
R-Squared Overall
*

p < .10
p < .05
***
p < .01
a
in hours
b
in hundreds of thousands
c
in years
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered on campaign
**
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Model 1
Estimate
(Standard error)
34.11***
(2.096)
-5.193***
(0.313)
-8.191***
(0.941)
1.216***
(0.413)
-0.747***
(0.056)
12.48***
(3.148)
-0.017
(1.068)
-0.108
(0.070)
0.030***
(0.003)
-1.335***
(0.489)
0.499
(1.304)
0.435***
(0.107)
1.529
(0.985)
4.558
(3.828)
-8.564**
(3.545)
1,637
0.40
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Figure 1.1 A Conceptual Model of the Impact of a Regulator-Initiated Digital Marketing Campaign on Consumer Recall
Compliance

CHAPTER 2
USER-GENERATED SERVICE ENGAGEMENT VOLUME IN ONLINE
COMMUNITIES: THE MODERATING ROLE OF FIRM
INVOLVEMENT
A key area of interest for firms is the development of engaged customers. While
definitions of engagement vary depending on the context, van Doorn et al. (2010)
describe customer engagement activities (CE) as “behavioral manifestations that have a
brand or firm focus, beyond purchase, resulting from motivational drivers.” Firms seek to
foster CE for the emotional or psychological bonds it can forge between them and
customers (Gill, Sridhar, and Grewal 2017; Kumar and Pansari 2016). The financial
returns from an engaged customer base are substantial. Gallup (2014) reports that fully
engaged customers (those emotionally attached to a brand) provide a 23% premium in
terms of share of wallet, profitability, and relationship growth compared to the average
customer. As consumers increasingly interact with brands and one another online, firms
are ramping up their efforts. In a 2015 study of 478 senior marketers and chief marketing
officers worldwide, over 80% said they’d rely on technology to aid in fostering
conversations between their brands and consumers and in building advocacy and trust
amongst consumers over the next three to five years (Marketo 2015).
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Extant research has examined how consumers demonstrate their engagement with
a brand, including by posting about it online (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; HennigThurau 2004), sharing positive word of mouth (WOM) (de Matos and Rossi 2008),
disseminating brand-related knowledge to others (Hollebeek, Srivastava, and Chen 2019),
and participating in sponsored blog campaigns (Hughes, Swaminathan, and Brooks
2019). However, an understudied form of CE emerges in the service-related
conversations consumers have with one another online. Service-related engagement is a
pillar of CE theory, affirmed by Brodie et al.’s (2011) contention that the development of
the CE concept reflects “customers’ interactive, co-creative experiences with other
stakeholders in focal, networked service relationships.” Customers who attempt to solve
product- and service-related issues collaboratively engage in an effortful activity that
builds bonds amongst a brand’s online audience and contributes to subsequent WOM.
Importantly, the valence of these interactions serves as a functional form of WOM that is
impacted by the brand-producing firm’s participation in the conversation (Homburg,
Ehm, and Artz 2015; Kumar and Pansari 2016). Many firms accommodate consumers’
desires to engage in communal service delivery by hosting online forums in which
consumers can interact with one another to ask questions and find solutions. Over time,
repeated interactions between consumers about specific topics facilitate the development
of social networks that not only connect current consumers of a brand, but also recruit
future consumers (van Doorn et al. 2011).
In the current study, I examine user-generated service engagement (UGSE)
volume: the volume of collaborative service-related conversations that consumers have
with one another online focused on solving product- and service-related issues (Zhao,
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Laga, and Crespi 2009). Consumers participating in user-generated service (UGS) engage
in communal service delivery, a form of CE, by relying on the knowledge of other
consumers to “crowdsource” solutions (Dholakia et al. 2009; van Doorn et al. 2010).
Frequently, these service-focused interactions occur on firm-hosted online forum
platforms, in which the service-related discussion revolves around the products and
services of the firm that hosts the forum (referred to as the “focal firm” hereafter).
However, similar to the way in which online WOM also occurs on third-party
platforms unowned by the focal firm, so does UGS. For example, AT&T has both a firmowned online forum platform on its website and a firm-unowned forum on a third-party
website, Reddit, a popular social news aggregator. This third-party forum is not under the
governance of AT&T and has emerged organically. Firms have an inherent interest in
maintaining active online customer communities, as community members possess higher
levels of brand identification, greater brand loyalty, and stronger recommendation
intentions than non-members (Algesheimer et al. 2005; Bagozzi and Dholakia 2006).
However, firms that host online forums on their own websites also face risks. A senior
executive described implementing an effective CE strategy on firm-owned platforms as
having “no room for error” (Porter and Donthu 2011). Consumers may perceive a firm’s
ownership of a social platform as placing a perceived limit on how much consumers can
participate in solving each other’s issues without firm involvement (Ranjan and Read
2016). While firms often exert control over their owned platforms and can establish
norms of behavior for consumers to adhere to, little is known about how the UGS that
emerges on platforms unowned by the focal firm compares (Dholakia et al. 2009).
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In addition to platform ownership, firm involvement in online communities can
also take the form of the focal firm participating in conversations between customers.
Firms that post marketer-generated content on firm-owned platforms have been shown to
increase customer sentiment, spending, and cross-buying (Kumar et al. 2016; Meire et al.
2019). Although existing research extolling the benefits of customer communities
highlights the heightened brand engagement of these passionate users, too much
engagement from the firm, specifically on service-related issues, could be detrimental.
While firm employees who handle service requests in public digital arenas increase the
brand-related evaluations of non-participating onlookers, too much participation by firm
employees on service-related issues can decrease customer sentiment (Harrison-Walker
2001; Homburg, Ehm, and Artz 2015). Relatedly, little is known about the impact of the
focal firm’s employees visiting firm-unowned platforms to provide service-related
assistance to consumers, partly because existing work has largely only focused on one
type of platform ownership at a time.
For marketing decisionmakers within firms, managing burgeoning online
communities of customers dedicated to collaboratively solving service issues presents a
valuable opportunity. Community members can develop greater engagement with the
firm’s product and services, gain expertise by communicating with likeminded others,
and save firms the cost of using formal service channels to address these “crowdsourced”
questions that would have otherwise required firm involvement. These communities are
often populated by “super users” who transmit their brand-related passion to others
(Noble, Noble, and Adjei 2012).
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To my knowledge, no research has thus far examined how user-generated service
engagement volume can vary based on two dimensions of firm involvement: firm
platform ownership and firm employee participation. While existing work has examined
the impact of social capital on knowledge contribution (Wasko and Faraj 2005), the
social benefits from networking and interacting in a community (Dholakia et al. 2009),
and the impact of consumer commitment and reciprocity on participation (Wiertz and de
Ruyter 2007), little attention has been devoted to examining the role firms play in driving
consumer engagement in service-focused online communities.
My study seeks to fill two noteworthy voids in extant customer engagement
literature. Firstly, I examine how firm involvement through platform ownership
contributes to user-generated service engagement volume. While existing work has
demonstrated that the elasticity of WOM volume on sales is higher on third-party
platforms than on firm-owned platforms (You, Vadakkepatt, and Joshi 2015), no work
has yet examined if firm platform ownership plays a role in the volume of UGSE, a
pertinent question for managers that I seek to answer using a unique Web-scraped
dataset. Secondly, no work has examined how another form of firm involvement, firm
employee participation in online communities, impacts UGSE volume. Thirdly, existing
UGSE work’s focus on a single platform and its active members does not provide
insights on how onlookers, uninvolved with UGS’ creation, evaluate the focal firm and
its members.
I use a multi-method approach that utilizes a large and unique predominantly
primary dataset and an experiment to examine UGSE volume. I assemble my data by
using SQL queries, web scraping, webpage mirroring, and Hypertext Markup Language
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(HTML) webpage parsing techniques. I explore UGSE volume by amassing a dataset of
over 59,000 service-seeking posts by customers on online forums from 2013 to 2017.
Service-seeking posts are questions posed by consumers on online forums that hope to
elicit service-related support from other consumers. To examine the role of firm platform
ownership, I gather data on four firms on both firm-owned and firm-unowned forums for
each, totaling eight online forums. To explore the role of firm employee participation, I
identify over 9,000 service-seeking posts in which the firm’s employees involve
themselves directly by being the first users to respond to the post.
The manuscript makes several contributions to marketing literature. First, this
study is the only one that I am aware of that demonstrates how user-generated service
engagement volume is lower on firm-owned platforms. In other words, firm platform
ownership lessens the impact of post characteristics related to customer sentiment and
emotions that otherwise increase UGSE volume. This finding is significant for managers
tasked with increasing engagement in their online communities, as past research has
described CE efforts as generally more effective on firm-owned platforms; for servicerelated engagement, the opposite may be true.
Second, I find evidence that firm employee participation in UGS creation is
associated with lower UGSE on posts that contain anxiety-related language. Specifically,
while service-seeking posts that contain words indicating customer anxiety receive more
UGSE overall, when an employee of the focal firm comments on the post before any
other user, UGSE volume is lower. This finding is significant because it can be
instructive to firms that believe that employee participation increases engagement. When
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customers experience negative emotions, they may wish to visit the forum to interact with
other users and not the focal firm.
Third, I find experimental evidence that even non-members of online
communities exhibit more positive engagement-related intentions when evaluating UGS
interactions on firm-unowned forums. Specifically, participants were more likely to
recommend the forum and return to the forum when the focal firm did not own the
platform, rating the helpfulness of the forum’s information and the product-related
knowledge of its members more favorably when the forum was firm-unowned.
Importantly, consumers seem to attribute the credit for service-related assistance to the
forum, and not the focal firm.
Collectively, the findings should provide compelling evidence to firms that firm
involvement in service-focused online communities is, in large part, associated with
decreased UGSE volume. Although existing CE frameworks stress firm ownership,
involvement, and governance as key engagement-increasing factors, the findings from
this study suggest that the opposite effect emerges in service-focused communities, and
that even non-participants in UGS interactions more favorably evaluate firm-unowned
platforms.

Literature Review, Conceptual Framework, and Hypotheses

While existing customer engagement (CE) frameworks have emphasized the
importance of service cocreation as a core CE tenet, very little research attention has been
devoted to collaborative online service platforms (Brodie et al. 2011). Notably, Wasko
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and Faraj (2005) found that the self-enhancement of one’s reputation was a primary
driver of knowledge contribution in an online service-focused community. Extant work
has also studied the impact of customers’ feelings of commitment to the online
community and to the host firm on their contributions to UGS. Consumers contributed
more knowledge when they felt committed to the community but demonstrated no such
heightened engagement when they felt committed to the platform-hosting firm (Wiertz
and de Ruyter 2007).
Although the online forum environments that typically provide the empirical
settings for studies of communal service delivery can exist on both firm-owned and firmunowned platforms, existing work has examined one platform at a time. However,
Schweidel and Moe (2014) have demonstrated that the inferences marketing researchers
make regarding social media activity are dependent on what venue they choose to focus
on. While firms can become involved in online service-focused communities through
hosting the platforms, they can also exert influence by enlisting their employees to
participate in the community interactions. Extant research has highlighted the critical role
firm employees play in customer engagement but has provided limited insight into how
engagement via employee participation is perceived in communities whose focus is to
stimulate consumer-to-consumer conversations (Harrison-Walker 2001; Kumar and
Pansari 2016). Given the lack of research on employee participation in service-focused
communities, it is difficult to determine if this form of firm involvement creates value for
consumers, as, to be successful, the conversation type and topic provided by firms to its
consumers must match the value that the firm contributes (Miller and Tucker 2013).
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Evidence from prior research assessing the impact of firm involvement on usergenerated content creation outside of the domain of service is also inconsistent. For
example, while firm ownership of online environments is said to provide a way for firms
to oversee their online communities and determine if they can help consumers with their
issues, word of mouth valence and volume is more positive on third-party platforms
(Dholakia et al. 2009; Harrison-Walker 2001; You, Vadakkepatt, and Joshi 2015).
Relatedly, while firms often encourage their employees to handle customer service
requests digitally (Hogreve, Bilstein, and Hoerner 2019), too much firm engagement in
online forums devoted to service-related topics has been shown to have a detrimental
effect on customer sentiment (Homburg, Ehm, and Artz 2015).
The mixed evidence regarding what the role of the firm should be in usergenerated service-focused communities is not satisfactory in advancing knowledge about
how firms can foster UGSE. Specifically, several questions are worth examining. What is
the impact of a firm’s ownership of an online service-focused community’s platform on
UGSE volume? Do a firm’s employees’ contributions to user-generated service
conversations lead to greater engagement? Is information on firm-owned or firmunowned platforms evaluated differently by consumers? Do these platform differences
contribute to other forms of customer engagement beyond UGSE volume?
To answer these questions, I develop a conceptual framework that draws on
insights from customer engagement theoretical frameworks to derive key engagement
factors pertinent in service-focused contexts. Figure 2.1 presents the conceptual
framework for the study. Among other context-dependent factors, extant CE frameworks
contend that engagement efforts must consider a) customer sentiment, b) customer
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emotion, c) direct firm involvement/actions, and d) customer network assets (Harmeling
et al. 2017; Hollebeek, Srivastava, and Chen 2019; Kumar and Pansari 2016; Pansari and
Kumar 2017). Based on these insights, my framework considers the role of a) customer
sentiment, b) customer anger, c) customer anxiety, d) a firm’s ownership of the CE
platform, and e) firm employees’ participation on the platform. I also consider a
customer’s network assets by including two social network-related control variables in
my framework.
As seen in Figure 2.1, in my context, a customer’s sentiment is conceptualized as
the valence (positivity or negativity) of the service-seeking post they contribute to the
online forum community (Ordenes et al. 2017). The service-related concerns that
customers share as new topics for discussion within the community are called “posts,”
whereas the replies they receive from other community members are termed “comments.”
I examine customer emotions by focusing on two emotions that often emerge in servicerelated contexts: anger and anxiety (Jerger and Wirtz 2017; Luong 2005; Sundaram and
Webster 2000). I propose that these dimensions of customer sentiment, anger, and
anxiety each impact the volume of user-generated service engagement in service-focused
online communities.
While existing research has often used the terms sentiment and emotion
interchangeably, they represent conceptually different aspects of a customer’s online
post. Sentiments are enduring emotional dispositions about objects that have been
developed over time, representing affective elements of enduring relationships (SmithLovin 1989). Customers who have an underlying positivity or negativity share their
sentiments through writing posts of different valence. For example, post valence can
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range from extremely negative to extremely positive and become amplified when
surrounded by words like “extremely” or “kind of” (Ordenes et al. 2017). While
sentiment is considered conscious, emotions, on the other hand, are considered
preconscious. Emotions are said to influence the sentiment that individuals feel towards
an object (Munezero et al. 2014). Given that sentiment and emotion represent two related
but distinct concepts that have each received attention in customer engagement literature,
I include both in my framework, narrowing my focus on emotions likely to arise
following service issues.
I propose that the impacts of customer sentiment, anger, and anxiety are
moderated by a firm’s ownership of the platform. Additionally, I propose that the
participation of firm employees in the user-to-user interactions on the platform also
moderates the impact of customer sentiment, anger, and anxiety on UGSE volume.
Importantly, I predict that both dimensions of firm involvement will have negative
moderating effects on UGSE volume. I now describe each of these factors individually.
Customer Sentiment
Existing work has provided insights on the relationship between customer
sentiment and engagement-related behaviors. Hollebeek and Chen (2014) identified
positively valenced activity towards the focal brand as a form of brand engagement by
consumers. Schweidel and Moe (2014) demonstrated that brand-related valence is
associated with online posting volume, finding that increases in the underlying brandspecific sentiment amongst consumers led to increased activity in online forums. Berger
and Milkman (2012) also studied consumer information sharing, finding that positive
online news articles were more likely to be shared than negative content. In contexts in
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which consumers rely on the insights of other consumers to solve their service-related
issues, more positively-valenced posts are likely to receive more comments than
negatively-valenced posts that may be categorized as complaining. While negative
emotions from the poster may signal urgency and increase UGSE volume, negativity
alone is likely low arousal content. Thus, insights from extant research would suggest
that more positive customer sentiment on service-seeking posts is likely related to greater
UGSE volume, although I make no hypothesis-based prediction.
Customer Anger and Anxiety
A key factor that drives consumers to share content with others is the arousal the
content induces. In the customer engagement literature, customer emotions are
considered a key antecedent to engagement (Pansari and Kumar 2017). While more
positive emotions increase engagement in other contexts, the negative emotions that often
accompany service issues likely lead to a different emotion-engagement relationship.
When presented with a high- or low-anger version of a description of a negative customer
experience, consumers were more likely to share the more anger-inducing experience,
driven by the arousal it evoked (Berger and Milkman 2012). More broadly, consumers
also engage more with anger- or anxiety-inducing information, evidenced by Berger and
Milkman’s (2012) finding that more anger- or anxiety-laden news articles were more
likely to be shared. Beyond sharing information, Yin, Bond, and Zhang (2014)
determined that other consumers found online reviews higher in anxiety-related content
to be more helpful. In user-generated service contexts, customer emotions of anger and
anxiety related to product or service experiences are likely to increase engagement
amongst fellow online community members.
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Firm Platform Ownership
Past literature has identified a firm’s ownership (or sponsorship) of an online
environment as a critical element in increasing customer engagement. Community
members have been documented to have a greater feeling of affiliation with a brand if it
is associated with a community (Rosenbaum 2008). Early work examining online
customer complaint forums highlighted the value these firm-owned environments
provided. Firms that host their own online communities can more easily track the nature
of customer complaints and provide solutions for disgruntled consumers (HarrisonWalker 2001). Customers who voice their displeasure on third-party platforms may leave
firms unaware of service-related improvements they must make. Firms that host
communities focused on communal service delivery are also more well-equipped to
control the functional aspects of the site that can contribute to increasing users’
knowledge and identification with the community. The risk of leaving consumers to
create service without firm involvement is that the quality of information may be
unreliable (Dholakia et al. 2009).
However, a greater body of evidence suggests that firm-owned environments may
actually lead to lower customer engagement in specific contexts. Particularly in servicefocused online communities, customers visit these platforms to interact with other
customers. It stands to reason that if customers wanted to interact with the firm directly,
they would have instead utilized one of the many formal firm-owned channels for
service, including email exchanges or one-on-one online chats with firm representatives.
This line of thinking is supported in extant research examining CE on firm-unowned
platforms. Customers who have utilized online forums to communicate with other
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customers in product function-related conversations have been shown to spread positive
WOM and possess greater brand loyalty toward the focal firm even when it did not host
the platform (Gruen, Osmonbekov, and Czaplewski 2006). Relatedly, consumer WOM
volume on third-party platforms (i.e., independent sites) has also been shown to affect
sales more strongly than WOM on firm-owned platforms, such as the focal retailers’ sites
(You, Vadakkepatt, and Joshi 2015).
In the absence of firm platform ownership, customers may also feel a stronger
internal service locus of control in firm-unowned platforms, as the focal firm is not
present to answer questions or assist in service provision. Internal service locus of control
beliefs have been shown to have a positive impact on a customer’s motivation to
coproduce service (Büttgen, Schumann, and Ates 2012). Consumers on firm-owned
environments likely feel less in control of the service setting because of the firm’s
presence. Service-seeking posts with more positive sentiment and greater anger and
anxiety will likely receive less UGSE on firm-owned platforms. Stated formally:
Firm platform ownership negatively moderates the impact of customer sentiment
(H4), customer anger (H5), and customer anxiety (H6) on user-generated service
engagement volume such that their respective impact is weaker for posts on firmowned platforms.
Firm Employee Participation
Firms can also involve themselves in user-generated service interactions by
directing their employees to assist service-seeking customers. In fact, customers often
complain online in order to elicit service recovery from firms (Ma, Sun, and Kekre 2015).
Firms are likely to respond to customer posts that exhibit dissatisfaction, evidenced by
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their increased rate of response following a negative shock to their ratings (Proserpio and
Zervas 2017). While firms can privately address service issues in other service contexts,
interacting with customers on publicly facing platforms, like online forums, necessitates
evaluating its costs and benefits. For example, when firm employees participate in
successful service recovery efforts in a transparent online environment, even onlookers
uninvolved with the interaction report feeling greater trust toward the firm and improved
positive WOM intentions (Hogreve, Bilstein, and Hoerner 2019).
However, recent work has also demonstrated that employee responses to customer
concerns may also have negative WOM implications. When transparent service recovery
fails, Hogreve, Bilstein, and Hoerner (2019) report that customers expressed lower
purchase intentions and weaker WOM intentions. Proserpio and Zervas (2017)
demonstrated a conceptually similar effect: when hotels start responding to customer
ratings, customers leave fewer reviews. In cocreation-focused communities, consumers
may similarly respond negatively, with decreased engagement, to firm employee
participation. Shah (2006) presents evidence that heavy-handed governance (i.e., greater
emphasis on control) by external agents in open source software communities decreased
software coding contributions amongst users who participated as a hobby. Consumers
who contribute to user-generated service are likely also hobbyists, as the forum
environments in which they collaborate are often not driven by task-based engagement
initiatives by firms; these consumers to do not receive external rewards for their
participation (Harmeling et al. 2017). UGS-contributing customers may perceive firm
employee participation in the community as a signal of greater control being exerted by
the firm, thereby decreasing their motivation to contribute to topics in which there is
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already firm employee presence. Relatedly, users may feel as though service-seeking
posts that firm employees comment on no longer require customer insight to solve.
Although posts with more positive sentiment and greater expressions of anger and
anxiety are likely to generate more UGSE overall, I posit that when a firm employee is
the first to comment on these service-seeking posts, UGSE volume is comparatively
lower. In other words:
Firm employee participation negatively moderates the impact of customer
sentiment (H4), customer anger (H5), and customer anxiety (H6) on usergenerated service engagement volume such that their respective impact is weaker
for posts in which there is firm employee participation.

Research Methodology

The empirical settings for this study are eight online forums of four different focal
firms. These four firms operate in the personal computers, subscription television
services, and wireless cell phone industries. In addition to each of these firms having
firm-owned online forums on their websites, they also each have a dedicated third-party
firm-unowned forum on another website, Reddit. Therefore, each of these brands have
active forums that operate on both firm-owned and -unowned environments. Each of
these forums also have similar structures, where users can “post” (i.e., create) topics that
others can “comment” on (i.e., respond to). While there is no data available on the
volume of comments on firm-owned platforms, there were over a billion comments
posted on Reddit between 2005 to 2015, with the site being the sixth-most popular in the
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United States as of March of 2020 (Reddit 2015; Widman 2020). Although not all the
posted comments on Reddit are service-related, the base of users willing to engage in
UGS is surely meaningful for firms.
Online forums are an appealing setting to study user-generated service
engagement for several reasons. Firstly, marketers have frequently utilized the long-form
discussions that online forums facilitate to study consumers, as they are not hampered by
post length limitations characteristic of social networking platforms like Twitter
(Kozinets 2002; Kozinets et al. 2010). The freedom of users to post their thoughts in a
long-form manner also mitigates instances of posting extreme opinions because of post
length restrictions that do not allow for the full articulation of users’ thoughts (Moe and
Schweidel 2012). Secondly, online forums facilitate the development of social dynamics
between users in a more significant way than blogs, which also allow for long-form posts
(Godes and Silva 2012; Moe and Schweidel 2012). Consumers can both create new
topics for discussion and comment on the topics created by others, allowing for
functional conversational exchanges that, over time, build bonds amongst community
members. Thirdly, consumers have actively used online forum environments to
collaboratively solve service issues for over 20 years on platforms both owned and
unowned by the focal firm (Harrison-Walker 2001). Lastly, online forums provide
opportunities for self-identified employees of the firm to contribute to conversations
between consumers, allowing for an examination of the impact of firm employee
participation on UGSE.
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Data Sources and Measures
I assembled the data from online forums using a variety of different methods. The
unit of analysis for the study is an individual’s service-seeking post on an online forum.
On a typical online forum, many consumers create new topics for discussion on a given
day. Over time, the online forum provides an environment in which users can search
through both old and new topics, interact with other users on the specific “posts”
regarding these topics, and create their own new topics if necessary. In total, I gathered
data from eight online forums. Table 2.1 presents variables, their operationalizations, and
the role of each in the modeling for the first study.
The data on user-generated service engagement volume within online forums was
gathered using Structured Query Language (SQL) queries, web scraping, webpage
mirroring, and HTML webpage parsing techniques. To gather firm-unowned online
forum data, I used Google’s BigQuery service. BigQuery is an enterprise data warehouse
which allows users to create SQL queries to download data from Reddit, a popular social
news aggregation, web content rating, and discussion website (Widman 2020). I chose
Reddit because it hosts forums dedicated to each of the four focal brands I study. Users of
Reddit can post content on a variety of user-created venues called “subreddits.” These
subreddits are online forums dedicated to particular areas of interest, ranging from brandspecific (i.e., Samsung) to general interest topics (i.e., bodybuilding). Users can join
different subreddits based on their preferences. BigQuery allows researchers to identify
pertinent subreddits and download secondary data on forum posts (BigQuery 2020).
To gather primary data from firm-owned online forums, a variety of approaches
were required. It is important to note that firm-owned forum data is not publicly available
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or easily downloadable; none of the firm-owned forums I examined had an application
programming interface (API) that allowed users to download data. Additionally, firms
often make it deliberately difficult to download their forum data. The reason I elect to
only focus on four firms in my analysis is because I identified only four firms that had
observations over a long span of time, websites that could be scraped, and a presence on
firm-unowned forums on Reddit. Therefore, I engaged in a lengthy process to gather the
data. Firstly, HTTrack was used to create a list of all the webpages from which I wanted
to gather forum data. HTTrack is an open-source Web crawler and offline browser that
downloads webpages into HTML files that can be viewed offline (HTTrack 2020). I
provided HTTrack with website URLs for each page of forum interactions on the firmowned forums of interest. HTTrack then downloaded those supplied webpages and other
similar webpages using a Web crawler until it downloaded the entire history of the online
forum and the user interactions therein. Each page of the online forum was downloaded
as one HTML file. Information on the user who created each topic, the content of the
topic, and the calendar date of the post was found within each webpage’s HTML code.
To extract the data from a page of HTML code into a readable spreadsheet, I used
Python’s Beautiful Soup package. Whereas Python is a general-purpose programming
language, Beautiful Soup is a Python library used for parsing HTML documents
(Crummy 2020). I identified which elements (HTML “tags”) of the downloaded online
forums’ webpages were of interest and then wrote code for Beautiful Soup to navigate
each document’s HTML code and gather the elements I wanted to extract (i.e., “parse”). I
then wrote Python code that gathered these elements, organized them by the online
poster’s name, the service-seeking post’s topic, the calendar date of the post, etc., and
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created an Excel document that was appended with each webpage’s information. Using
these approaches, I downloaded online forum data from four firms from 2013 to 2017.
There is no extant literature, to my knowledge, that provides guidance on how to
categorize online forum posts into those that are and are not service-seeking. Not all
conversations on online forums are service-related; they can also revolve around general
topics, including current events. To determine if a post was service-seeking, I compiled a
list of common phrases present in all posts that were self-identified by the poster as
service-seeking. In several of firm-unowned forums that I examined, the community’s
guidelines stated that users seeking help with particular issues should self-classify their
posts using one of several words to aid the community in providing assistance. For
example, a user may ask a question regarding a malfunctioning cell phone and preface
his/her post with the “post tag” (the classification mechanism on the site) of “[Problem].”
A list of the suggested post tags that communities recommended service-seeking users
employ is provided in Table 2.2. For online forums that did not include guidance on post
tags, I used an automated procedure that identified if one or more of the words in Table
2.2 were found in a service-seeking post. For the purposes of this study, posts that met
these criteria were classified as service-seeking. Thus, the final sample for the main
specification includes a repeated cross-sectional dataset of 59,676 service-seeking posts
across eight online forums from 2013 to 2017.
Dependent measure. I operationalized user-generated service engagement
volume, my dependent measure, as the number of comments a service-seeking post
received on an online forum within 30 days of being posted. This is similar to how extant
research has conceptualized WOM volume (Liu 2006; Rui, Liu, and Whinston 2013). For
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example, if a service-seeking post receives a total of 11 comments in an online forum
over the 30 days following its posting, the dependent measure would equal 11. The
dependent measure thus captures UGSE volume at the individual post level. I elect to
restrict the number of comments I examine to the first 30 days because of the structure of
my customer network assets control variables. Given that my network-related variables
are on the monthly level, it makes more intuitive sense to also measure the dependent
variable for the duration of one month. Otherwise, a rare case may emerge in which a
post receives comments for eight months after being posted, while the control variable I
use still measures customer network assets in the month preceding it being posted.
Therefore, since I ultimately include one month lagged network-related control variables,
I also restrict the number of comments that are counted to 30 days (i.e., one month).
Customer sentiment. In my empirical context, users who create service-seeking
posts do so by expressing positivity or negativity (valence) in the text they post. I
operationalize customer sentiment as “Post Valence,” with posts that express more
positive sentiment having greater post valence; negatively-valenced posts have negative
“Post Valence.” To calculate each post’s valence, I use sentimentr, an R package that
calculates text polarity sentiment by taking into account words that negate, amplify, or
de-amplify the valence of the sentiment expressed by using a dictionary lookup approach
(a more detailed explanation of the package is available through Rinker 2019).
Customer anger and anxiety. Beyond the overall sentiment expressed in a serviceseeking post, online posters may also convey specific negative emotions as
manifestations of their affective processes (Berger and Milkman 2012; Rooderkerk and
Pauwels 2016). Two specific emotions of interest in service-related domains include
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anger and anxiety. The Linguistic Inquiry Word Count (LIWC) analyzes individuals’
verbal and written speech patterns to study the emotional, cognitive, and structural
components present (Pennebaker et al. 2015). LIWC uses automated text analysis to
determine each service-seeking post’s expression of anger and anxiety as a percentage of
the total words in each post related to each respective emotion. I operationalize customer
anger by creating a dummy variable, “Post contains Anger,” that takes a value of “1” if a
post contains at least one angry word and “0” otherwise. I operationalize customer
anxiety in the same way, creating the dummy variable “Post contains Anxiety” using the
same criteria.
Measures for moderator variables. The online forums that I examine in this study
are hosted on platforms both owned and unowned by the focal firm. By gathering data for
four firms that each have online forums on both owned and unowned platforms, I can
examine the moderating role of a firm’s ownership of a platform on user-generated
service engagement volume. I operationalize firm platform ownership by creating the
dummy variable, “Firm-Owned Forum Post,” that is coded “1” if the service-seeking post
is posted on a firm-owned forum and “0” if it is posted on a firm-unowned forum.
Within online forum environments both owned and unowned by the focal firm,
self-identified firm employees of the focal firm will often comment on the serviceseeking posts made by users. I identify instances in which the first “commenter” on a
service-seeking post is an employee of the focal product- or service-producing firm. To
operationalize firm employee participation, I create a dummy variable, “Firm Employee
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Comments First on Post,” that takes a value of “1” if the firm employee is the first user to
comment on a service-seeking post and “0” otherwise.4
Control variables. I first outline the rationale for including the control variables
before discussing their operational measures. I create the “Monthly Network Density”
variable to control for how connected each online forum’s service-focused community is
on a monthly level. More dense networks have a higher incidence of subgroups that are
interconnected to one another. As these subgroups develop, there is a greater likelihood
of cooperation amongst connected parties, likely contributing to greater UGSE (Thomaz
and Swaminathan 2015). I consider each online forum to be a separate network. Network
density refers to the proportion of connections between users from all possible
connections (Wasserman and Faust 1994). In my context, two users are connected if they
have each appeared on the same service-seeking post as posters or commenters in a given
month. If all active service-focused forum members had interacted with one another
through contributing to the same service-seeking posts in a month, a complete graph
would be formed, indicating maximum network density. Importantly, I measure network
density only amongst consumers who participate on service-seeking posts. In calculating
this, I do not include consumers who post on the forum but not on service-seeking posts.
Network density is one form of customer network assets I control for.

4

An alternative measure of firm employee participation could also be related to if a firm
employee comments on a service-seeking post at any time, not necessarily as the first
commenter. Given that my interest is in examining firm involvement, I consider firm
employees being the first commenters on the post as a stronger form of involvement, as
their comments likely shape the future comments of users on the respective serviceseeking posts.
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I also control for the size of the online community. Having more individuals in
close proximity has been shown to increase the likelihood of sharing information
(Consiglio, De Angelis, and Costabile 2018). Online forums that have more servicefocused users will also have more users able to comment on service-seeking posts, likely
increasing user-generated service engagement volume. To control for this possibility, I
create the “Number of Active Monthly Forum Contributors” variable, a count of the
number of users who post or comment on service-seeking posts in an online forum in a
given month. Communities with more forum contributors have “larger” networks as a
function of having more users, an important network asset for customers seeking
communal service assistance.
Following the processes outlined by Wasserman and Faust (1994), I determine
network density and network size by creating datasets comprised of the service-seeking
posts in each forum and the users who post and comment on these topics on a monthly
level for each of the eight forums in my dataset. I create a total of 480 datasets that
represent each of the focal firm-firm platform ownership-month combinations in my data.
I then transform these datasets into separate “n” by “m” incidence matrices, where “n”
(the rows) are the usernames of the users who posted in the forum in month-year
combination X. The “m” (column) dimension of the matrix is comprised of the titles of
the service-seeking posts created by users in the forum in month-year X. Therefore, if a
given user “U” posted/commented on topic “XYZ” a total of two times, the cell
corresponding to row “U” and column “XYZ” would equal “2.” If user “U” did not
post/comment on topic “XYZ,” the corresponding cell would equal “0.”
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I then multiply each matrix by its transpose to create a square “n” by “n”
adjacency matrix. The adjacency matrix represents the number of times any two users in
the forum posted/commented together the same post. For example, if users “A” and “B”
commented on the same topic four times in January of 2014, the corresponding entry in
their cell would equal “4.” Lastly, I use R’s igraph package to transform each matrix into
a social network graph. This graph also allows me to determine each forum’s network
density and size.
Past research has also controlled for the temporal element of posts; posts seeking
service on the weekend may receive more comments (Hughes, Swaminathan, and Brooks
2019). I thereby create the “Weekend Post” variable that takes a value of “1” if the
service-seeking post is created on a Saturday or Sunday and “0” otherwise. Relatedly, I
include year fixed effects for each post.

Model Specification

The dependent variable of interest, the number of comments a post receives
within 30 days of being posted, is a count variable. Poisson and negative binomial
distributions are commonly used to model count data. A likelihood ratio test indicated
that the conditional variance of the number of comments exceeded the conditional mean,
violating the equidispersion property and ruling out the Poisson model. A formal test of
overdispersion confirmed that a negative binomial model is preferable to a Poisson model
(t = 30.47, p<.01). Additionally, there is no evidence of the data being zero-inflated
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(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Therefore, a negative binomial model is preferred. The
empirical specification that I take to the data is as follows:
Number of Comments i =
β0 + β1 Post Valence i + β2 Post contains Anger i + β3 Post contains Anxiety i
+ β4 Firm-Owned Forum Post i
+ β5 Firm Employee Comments First on Post i
+ β6 Post Valence i x Firm-Owned Forum Post i
+ β7 Post contains Anger i x Firm-Owned Forum Post i
+ β8 Post contains Anxiety i x Firm-Owned Forum Post i
+ β9 Post Valence i x Firm Employee Comments First on Post i
+ β10 Post contains Anger i x Firm Employee Comments First on Post i
+ β11 Post contains Anxiety i x Firm Employee Comments First on Post i
+ β12 Monthly Network Density i,m-1
+ β13 Number of Active Monthly Forum Contributors i,m-1
+ β14 Weekend Post i + β15-18 Post Year y + ε i
where “i” refers to a service-seeking post, “m” refers to the calendar month the serviceseeking post was posted in an online community, “m-1” refers to the month directly
preceding the month in which the service-seeking post was posted, “y” refers to the year
during which the post was made, and “” refers to the random error. In addition to
counting the number of comments each service-seeking post amasses within 30 days in
each online forum, I also include network measures representative of customer network
assets in the online forum in the month before the post was made. For example, if a
service-seeking post was posted on January 1st of 2017, the dependent variable measures
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the number of comments the post received from January 1st of 2017 to 30 days thereafter.
The network measures in the model would then describe the network density and number
of active contributors in the forum in December of 2016, the month directly before the
post. To ensure that my measures of network-related characteristics temporally precede
the dependent measure, I lag both variables by one month. Therefore, these network
measures are the same for service-seeking posts that are posted within the same month in
the same online forum. The network measures vary by month and by online forum.
The standard errors are robust and clustered on the online forum (one of the eight
forums) in which the service-seeking post was posted. Thus, my empirical specification
attempts to quantify the impact of customer sentiment, customer anger, customer anxiety,
and firm involvement-related characteristics on user-generated service engagement
volume while accounting for several social network- and temporally related factors.

Results

Descriptives
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the variables. On average, serviceseeking posts receive 3.64 comments in their first 30 days. Some posts do not receive any
comments, while others receive up to 252. The average post valence in the posts
submitted by service-seeking users is .05, indicating that the average service-seeking post
is rather neutrally-valenced, expressing neither positive nor positive sentiment.
Approximately 13% of service-seeking posts contain words associated with anger, while
9% of posts contain words associated with anxiety. Some service-seeking posts contain
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only anger- or anxiety-related words, while others exhibit no such emotions. Firm-owned
forum posts comprise 73% of the observations in the dataset. Across firm-owned and unowned forums, employees of the focal firm are the first commenters on service-seeking
posts 16% of the time. In fact, firm employees are also sometimes the only commenters
on a service-seeking post. In an average month, 5% of forum members are connected to
one another by virtue of interacting on the same post. On average, almost 689 users either
post or comment on a service-seeking post in a given month. A fourth of the serviceseeking posts in the online forums are posted on Saturday or Sunday.
Examining the summary statistics by firm platform ownership reveals model free
evidence that service-seeking posts receive more comments (average of 7.23) on firmunowned platforms than on firm-owned platforms (average of 2.34). Additionally, model
free evidence would suggest that service-seeking posts in which a firm employee is the
first commenter receive fewer comments than those in which the firm employee is not the
first commenter (average of 2.12 compared to 3.94).
Table 2.4 provides a correlation matrix for the variables in the study. The
correlation between the number of comments on a service-seeking post and the firmowned post variable is -.40, indicating that there is a negative correlation between UGSE
volume and firm platform ownership. Additionally, UGSE volume is negatively
correlated with firm involvement via firm employees commenting first on a serviceseeking post (-.12). Importantly, the correlations between the post valence, post contains
anger, and post contains anxiety variables are each between -.15 and .16, providing some
evidence that they are each measuring distinct dimensions of customer sentiment and
emotion.
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Results for the Moderating Effects of Firm Platform Ownership and Firm Employee
Participation
Table 2.5 reports the results for the moderating impact of firm platform ownership
and firm employee participation on user-generated service engagement volume. In
addition to the standard reporting of regression coefficients, incidence rate ratios (IRRs)
are also provided. The incidence rate ratios of each respective model are equal to the
exponentiated coefficients of each negative binomial model. Since the difference between
two logs is equal to the log of their quotient, the IRR parameter estimate can also be
interpreted as the log of the ratio of expected counts (Cameron and Trivedi 2009).
Therefore, an incidence rate ratio less than “1” describes a variable that, when increased
by one unit, leads to an increase in the count of the dependent variable by a factor smaller
than one, ostensibly a decrease.
Model 1 of Table 2.5 examines the main effects of customer sentiment, anger, and
emotion in service-seeking posts on the number of comments the posts receive. On
average, posts that are more positively valenced receive marginally more comments (.18,
p<.06). The coefficient of “Post contains Anger” indicates that service-seeking posts that
exhibit anger would be expected to have more comments relative to posts that did not
contain anger (.13, p<.01). Similarly, posts that contain anxiety, on average, receive more
comments than posts that do not contain anxiety (.13, p<.01).
To test my formal hypotheses, I turn to Model 2 of Table 2.5. The results reveal
that the interaction between the post valence and firm-owned post variables is negative;
H1 is supported at 8% significance (-.27, p<.08). Thus, on average, service-seeking posts
of the same post valence receive less user-generated service engagement volume on firm-
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owned platforms, holding all else constant. In support of H2, the coefficient of the “Post
contains Anger” and “Firm Owned Post” interaction term is negative (-.13, p<.01); on
average, service-seeking posts that contain anger receive 12% fewer comments on firmowned platforms than on firm-unowned platforms (1 – the IRR of .88), holding all other
variables constant. There is also support for H3, as the coefficient of the interaction term
between the post contains anxiety and firm-owned forum post variables is negative and
significant (-.10, p<.01). Hypothesis 1 (at an 8% level of significance) and hypotheses 2
and 3 (at a 1% level of significance) each demonstrate that the effect of the post valence,
posts containing anger, and posts containing anxiety variables on UGSE volume is
negatively moderated by firm platform ownership.
Model 2 of Table 2.5 also examines the impact of firm involvement in UGS
through firm employee participation. H4 and H5 are not supported. Having a firm
employee comment first on a consumer’s service seeking post does not moderate the
impact of “Post Valence” or “Post contains Anger” on UGSE volume. However, on
average, fewer comments are contributed to service-seeking posts that contain anxiety
when the first commenter is a firm employee versus when another user is the first
commenter (-.04, p<.05). This would suggest that perhaps firm employees who comment
first on service-seeking posts containing anxiety decrease engagement because they
adequately address the issue or because other users do not feel compelled to participate in
UGS when a firm employee is present in the interaction. However, I make no formal
causal claims regarding this finding.
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Examining Three-Way Interactions
The findings that firm involvement, through both platform ownership and
employee participation, was associated with decreased UGSE volume led me to examine
the impact of both moderating variables together. Specifically, instances of firm
employees who comment first across service-seeking posts of similar valence, anger, and
anxiety may be related to different levels of UGSE volume depending on firm platform
ownership. To examine if the two-way interactions between firm employee participation
and post valence, anger, and anxiety, respectively vary based on firm platform ownership,
I examine three three-way interactions.
Model 1 of Table 2.6 reports results for the three-way interactions of interest. I
find a significant three-way interaction between the post valence, firm employee
comments first on post, and firm-owned forum post variables. Holding post valence
constant amongst posts in which a firm employee is the first commenter, firm-owned
forum posts have higher UGSE volume than firm-unowned forum posts (1.06, p<.05).
Similarly, for service-seeking posts containing anger whose first comment received is one
from a firm employee, there is significantly more UGSE volume on firm-owned forums
than on firm-unowned forums (.55, p<.01). Lastly, a similar effect is found related to
posts that contain anxiety. Anxious service-seeking posts that receive their first comment
from a firm employee receive significantly more engagement on firm-owned platforms
(1.00, p<.01) than on firm-unowned platforms. This evidence suggests that, when
holding customer sentiment, anger, and anxiety constant, respectively, firm-owned
platforms do not exhibit diminished UGSE volume compared to firm-unowned platforms
when firm employees are the first commenters; conversely, customers exhibit more
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engagement. This finding suggests that perhaps the firm-owned forum platform is more
conducive to engagement if the aforementioned conditions are met.

An Experiment Examining the Moderating Role of Firm Platform Ownership

The main study in the manuscript found that firm platform ownership negatively
moderated the impact of customer post valence, post anger, and post anxiety on usergenerated service engagement. In addition to examining engagement through
contributions to user-generated service, I also wanted to preliminary investigate if other
engagement-related behaviors, including likelihood to recommend or revisit the forum,
varied depending on firm platform ownership. Specifically, I wanted to examine whether
consumers who read but did not participate in a UGS-related interaction interpreted it
differently based on its existing on a firm-owned or -unowned platform. In addition to
these factors, I also examined if the effectiveness of the solution recommended by the
online community, something I could not infer from my secondary data, impacted
consumer evaluations of the UGS present in the forum.
Experimental Design
A total of 198 participants from an online subject pool were randomly assigned to
one of four experimental conditions. The study began with a brief scenario asking
participants to imagine that their Apple iPhone became “stuck while updating” to a new
software version, leading them to search online for a solution. The participants were then
told that as they searched for a solution to the issue online, they clicked on a link that
directed them to an online forum. The two forum conditions participants were exposed to
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were a) a firm-owned forum (on Apple’s website) or b) a firm-unowned Apple-specific
forum on Reddit. Participants were then presented with a fictional interaction between
forum users seeking to solve the same issue as the participants.
The content of the fictional interaction, including the service-seeking post, the
subsequent comments, and the names of the fictitious online posters remained identical
between conditions; only the logo at the top of the forum site was manipulated to remind
consumers of what forum platform they had visited. The fictional interaction was
comprised of six users who exchanged ideas until one final solution was proposed, a
“hard reset.” The participants were then told that they tried the solution and either a) the
device then worked or b) the device still didn’t work, the other manipulation in the study.
Figure 2.2 presents the stimulus that participants who were in the firm-owned forum and
solution works condition were exposed to, while Figure 2.3 provides the stimulus
received by those in the firm-unowned forum and solution doesn’t work condition.
Participants then answered questions on one to seven Likert-type scales related to
the focal firm (Apple), including their likelihood to switch to a competing phone
manufacturer, say positive things about the firm, continue doing business with Apple in
the future, and complain to other customers about the firm. Participants were also asked
to evaluate the online forum environment itself and rate their likelihood to complain to
other customers about the forum, return to the forum for any other smartphone issues, and
their willingness to help others on the forum in the future. Additionally, participants rated
the product-related knowledge of the forum members and the helpfulness of the
information provided on the product forum.
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Results
Participants reported they’d be more likely to recommend the forum (F(1, 195) =
4.87, p<.05), rated the product-related knowledge of the forum members more highly
(F(1, 195 = 4.85, p<.05), and found the forum’s information more helpful (F(1, 195) =
4.90, p<.05) in the firm-unowned forum condition. Additionally, when the solution
provided was said to work (i.e., solve the issue), participants in the firm-unowned forum
condition were significantly more likely to recommend the forum to someone else than
those in the firm-owned forum condition (F(1, 91) = 9.92, p<.01). Participants provided
with a working solution also reported being significantly more likely to return to the
forum for any future service issues in the firm-unowned forum condition than in the firmowned condition (F(1, 91, p<.05). Both engagement-related behaviors were more likely
to occur following service-related help provided by fellow customers on firm-unowned
platforms.
Compared to participants in the firm-owned forum condition, participants also
rated the product-related knowledge of forum members as higher in the firm-unowned
forum condition (F(1, 91) = 8.86, p<.01) and evaluated the firm-unowned forum’s
information as more helpful (F(1, 91) = 6.98, p<.05). In other words, participants whose
service issue was solved indicated they’d be significantly more likely to spread positive
word of mouth, evaluate the community as more knowledgeable, and exhibit greater
future customer engagement on firm-unowned platforms than on firm-owned platforms.
These preliminary results perhaps indicate that the ownership of the forum by the focal
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firm may in fact detract from its utility as both a service-delivery vehicle and as a
customer engagement tool.
However, when the solution provided did not work, there were no significant
differences in participants’ responses based on the firm platform ownership condition
they were assigned to. Participants did not indicate they’d be more likely to complain to
Apple or the forum between platform ownership conditions. These preliminary results
suggest that firm platform ownership may also be a negative moderator for engagementrelated behavioral intentions, perceptions of UGS-generating customers’ knowledge, and
evaluations of information helpfulness when the service-related issue is resolved.
However, when the solution provided does not work, neither firm-owned nor -unowned
forums suffer the consequences of negative word of mouth or weaker future behavioral
intentions. This perhaps suggests that consumers do not assign blame to the focal firm if
other users provide an ineffective solution. However, in assigning credit for effective
solutions, firm-unowned forums seem to reap significantly more benefits than firmowned forums.

Discussion

Research Implications
The two studies in this research offer insights into how firm involvement in online
communities can impact user-generated service engagement. Specifically, I contribute to
CE literature by examining two forms of firm involvement in the same study: firm
platform ownership and firm employee participation. By examining an understudied form
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of engagement in which users generated service collaboratively online, I find evidence
that firm involvement can be detrimental to engagement. While extant literature suggests
that firm sponsorship of online service-focused environments increases customer
engagement with firms, I find that the impact of customer sentiment, customer anger, and
customer anxiety on user-generated service engagement volume is decreased on firmowned platforms (Dholakia et al. 2009). This insight is similar in spirit to Schweidel and
Moe’s (2014) examination of different social media platform venues. Depending on the
firm’s ownership of the online platform, the impact of customer sentiment and emotions
on engagement could prove starkly different.
I also provide evidence of a relationship between firm employee participation in
an online service-focused topic and subsequent consumer engagement in that topic. I find
that for posts that contain anxiety, when firm employees are the first to provide service
assistance, UGSE volume decreases. Theoretically, this suggests that service-focused
contexts may not exhibit the well-studied pattern of firm- and marketer-generated content
leading to increased customer engagement and engagement-related behaviors (Kumar et
al. 2016; Meire et al. 2019). The functional form of the word of mouth exchanged
between consumers is an important characteristic to consider in examining the
relationship between firm participation in an online community and consumers’
responses to that participation.
I also find a boundary condition for the engagement-decreasing impact of firm
involvement in service-focused online communities. Specifically, when consumers share
service-seeking posts that contain anxiety and a firm employee is the first to address their
concern, firm ownership of the online platform is related to increased UGSE volume.
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Similarly, when firm employees are the first commenters in a service-seeking post that
contains anger, UGSE volume is greater on firm-owned platforms. Although each form
of firm involvement may independently have no effect or decrease UGSE volume on
negative customer emotions, when both types of firm involvement are present, usergenerated service is greater across the three post characteristics I examine. This finding is
consistent with research that stresses that firms seeking to increase CE must carefully
manage which resources they make available to customers and when they elect to
participate in the online community (Porter et al. 2011).
Finally, I provide preliminary evidence that firm platform ownership even
impacts the engagement-related intentions of consumers who are not directly involved in
the user-generated service interaction. Experimental participants were more likely to
recommend the forum to others when they were shown a customer-to-customer
interaction in a firm-unowned environment. In addition to engagement, firm platform
ownership also led to lower perceptions of forum information helpfulness and forum
member product-related knowledge. This insight adds to work on how virtually present
others interpret service recovery efforts online, with the experiment suggesting that
beyond the effectiveness of the recovery itself, firm sponsorship of the venue is a key
factor (Hogreve, Bilstein, and Hoerner 2019). Importantly, this research answers a call by
Lamberton and Stephen (2016) for more research in the digital domain related to
collective behavior in social networks. By demonstrating that user-generated service
engagement is often lower when firm involvement is higher, this research also provides
evidence that not all successful customer engagement efforts require the focal firm to the
centerpiece.
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Managerial Implications
This research also offers actionable insights to marketing managers wishing to
utilize online forums as service delivery vehicles. The negative moderating effect of firm
involvement on user-generated service engagement volume echoes findings from
industry. Through their online community oversight efforts, more than half of Fortune
1000 companies have been estimated to destroy value for themselves and their customers
(Porter and Donthu 2011). In contexts in which customer participation is critical (i.e.,
open source software development), firm involvement may not only lead to decreased
customer sentiment (Homburg, Ehm, and Artz 2015), but decreased user-generated
service engagement in service-focused communities. Increasingly, firms like Sprint
provide links to their firm-hosted online forums under the “Support” banner of their
websites. Firms are actively pushing consumers to use online forums to solve servicerelated issues, but engagement with these topics is demonstrated to be lower on firmhosted platforms.
Managers must consider if the decreased engagement consumers exhibit as a
result of firm involvement are unilaterally undesirable. For example, it’s possible that
some firms may wish to decrease customer engagement on posts containing negative
emotions like anger or anxiety as to not amass highly negative word of mouth on
particular posts. As an online environment becomes more negative, posting may also
decrease (Moe and Schweidel 2012). Additionally, if firms observe that employee
participation in a communal service environment decreases engagement on posts
containing anxiety, this could direct firms to strategically deploy their firm employees
specifically on posts containing negative emotions. While the correlations between firm
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employee participation and posts containing anger/anxiety are -.01 and .00, respectively,
firms may be able to use these insights to comment on certain posts more strategically in
the future. Lastly, it’s important to note that not all consumers who derive benefits from
user-generated service interactions post content themselves. The virtually present
consumers who read UGS interactions and apply their insights, as represented in the
experiment, also can become more engaged with the forum, but not necessarily the
forum-hosting firm.
To counter the detrimental impact of firm involvement on user-generated service
engagement, firms may also consider expending resources to maintain online
communities on third-party websites that consumers are led to believe are not hosted by
the focal firm.
Limitations and Future Directions
The findings of the research are subject to some limitations. Firstly, the study is
limited to four firms that are predominantly active in three technologically sophisticated
industries, meaning that caution is warranted in generalizing the findings to other “lowertech” industries. However, the benefit from using data from technologically sophisticated
industries is that consumers are more likely to develop ongoing online communities and
generate word of mouth in these product categories (Dwyer 2007). Secondly, although
my focus was on determining user-generated service engagement volume following a
firm employee’s involvement in the service-seeking post, I do not have information
regarding if employees randomly select posts to comment on. Although evidence exists
that hotel employees respond to differently valenced reviews at the same rate, I cannot
generalize this behavior to online forum settings (Proserpio and Zervas 2017). Third,
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more research examining the underlying motivations of customers to ask and answer
user-generated questions online is needed to inform firms about how to guide these
customers into their online communities and hopefully reap engagement-related benefits.
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Table 2.1 Variable Names and Operationalization
Construct/Label
in Conceptual
Framework

Operationalization

Role in
Modeling

Number of
Comments

A count variable capturing
the number of comments a
service-seeking post
receives in an online forum
from the time it is posted
up to 30 days thereafter.

Dependent
variable

Post Valence

The sentiment (positivity
or negativity) of a serviceseeking post. The higher
the valence, the more
positive the sentiment.

Explanatory
variable

Post Contains
Anger

Dummy variable coded “1”
if the service-seeking post
Explanatory
contains words related to
variable
the expression of anger and
"0" otherwise.

Post Contains
Anxiety

Dummy variable coded “1”
if the service-seeking post
Explanatory
contains words related to
variable
the expression of anxiety
and "0" otherwise.

Firm Platform
Ownership

Firm-Owned
Forum Post

Coded “1” for a serviceseeking post on a firmowned forum platform and
“0” for a service-seeking
post on a firm-unowned
forum platform.

Moderator
variable

Firm Employee
Participation

Firm Employee
Comments First on
Post

Coded “1” if an employee
of the focal firm is the first
user to comment on a
service-seeking post and
“0” otherwise.

Moderator
variable

User-Generated
Service
Engagement
Volume

Customer
Sentiment

Customer Anger

Customer Anxiety

Variable Name
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Customer Network
Assets

Customer Network
Assets

Monthly Network
Density

The proportion of
connections between
service-seeking consumers
in a forum out of the total
possible connections on a
monthly basis.

Control
variable

Number of Active
Monthly Forum
Contributors

The number of users who
post or comment on
service-seeking posts in an
online forum in a given
month.

Control
variable

Weekend Post

Coded “1” for serviceseeking posts posted on a
weekend and “0”
otherwise.

Control
variable
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Table 2.2 Post Tags Used to Identify Service-Seeking Posts
SERVICE-SEEKING POST TAGS
Assist
Assistance
Concern
Concerns
Guidance
Help
Helping
Problem
Problems
Question
Questions
Solution
Solutions
Support
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Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name
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Number of Comments
Post Valence
Post contains Anger
Post contains Anxiety
Firm-Owned Forum Post
Firm Employee Comments First on Post
Monthly Network Density
Number of Active Monthly Forum Contributors
Weekend Post

Mean
3.64
0.05
0.13
0.09
0.73
0.16
0.05
688.90
0.25

Standard
Deviation
5.39
0.16
0.34
0.28
0.44
0.37
0.08
361.01
0.43

Minimum

Maximum

0
-0.88
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

252
2.79
1
1
1
1
1
1,528
1

Number of
Observations
59,692
59,693
59,694
59,695
59,696
59,697
59,676
59,689
59,697

Table 2.4 Correlation Matrix
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Variable Name

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1

Number of Comments

1

2

Post Valence

0.02

1

3

Post contains Anger

0.05

-0.15

1

4

Post contains Anxiety

0.04

-0.08

0.16

1

5

Firm-Owned Forum Post

-0.40

-0.04

-0.04

-0.04

1

6

Firm Employee Comments First on Post

-0.12

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.25

1

7

Monthly Network Density

0.26

0.03

0.04

0.02

-0.53

-0.14

1

8

Number of Active Monthly Forum Contributors

-0.20

-0.01

-0.06

-0.02

0.47

0.11

-0.39

1

9

Weekend Post

-0.01

0.00

-0.01

-0.01

0.01

-0.04

-0.01

0.01

9

1

Table 2.5 Main Results

Dependent Variable: Number of Comments
Constant
Post Valence
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Post contains Anger
Post contains Anxiety
Firm-Owned Forum Post
Firm Employee Comments First on Post
Post Valence x Firm-Owned Forum Post
Post contains Anger x Firm-Owned Forum Post
Post contains Anxiety x Firm-Owned Forum Post
Post Valence x Firm Employee Comments First on Post

Model 1
Main Effect Negative
Binomial Model
Incidence
Rate Ratios
Estimate
Estimate
(Standard
(Standard
error)
error)
***
1.230
3.422***
(0.171)
(0.585)
*
0.177
1.194*
(0.106)
(0.127)
***
0.133
1.142***
(0.0386)
(0.044)
***
0.129
1.138***
(0.029)
(0.033)

Model 2
Full Negative Binomial Model

Estimate
(Standard
error)
2.304***
(0.194)
0.242**
(0.100)
0.186***
(0.025)
0.155***
(0.021)
-1.100***
(0.191)
-0.124
(0.151)
-0.268*
(0.148)
-0.131***
(0.041)
-0.096***
(0.032)
-0.129

Incidence
Rate Ratios
Estimate
(Standard
error)
10.01***
(1.940)
1.274**
(0.127)
1.205***
(0.030)
1.167***
(0.024)
0.333***
(0.064)
0.883
(0.134)
0.765*
(0.113)
0.877***
(0.036)
0.908***
(0.029)
0.879

(0.152)
-0.044
(0.050)

Post contains Anger x Firm Employee Comments First on Post
Post contains Anxiety x Firm Employee Comments First on
Post
Monthly Network Density (lagged)
Number of Active Monthly Forum Contributors (lagged)
Weekend Post
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Post Year Fixed Effects
N (sample size)
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC
*

p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered on forum

3.314***
(1.190)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.015
(0.019)

27.51***
(32.75)
1.000
(0.000)
0.985
(0.018)
Yes
59,676
-139,757
279,528.90
279,591.90

-0.044**
(0.019)
0.295
(0.416)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.011
(0.009)

(0.134)
0.957
(0.048)
0.957**
(0.019)
1.344
(0.559)
1.000
(0.000)
0.989
(0.009)
Yes
59,676
-135,428
270,873.20
270,936.20

Table 2.6 Examining Three-Way Interactions

Dependent Variable: Number of Comments
Constant
Post Valence
Post contains Anger
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Post contains Anxiety
Firm-Owned Forum Post
Brand Employee Comments First on Post
Post Valence x Firm-Owned Forum Post
Post contains Anger x Firm-Owned Forum Post
Post contains Anxiety x Firm-Owned Forum Post
Post Valence x Firm Employee Comments First on Post
Post contains Anger x Firm Employee Comments First on Post

Model 1
Full Negative Binomial Model with
three-way Interactions
Incidence Rate
Ratios
Estimate
Estimate
(Standard error)
(Standard error)
***
2.306
10.03***
(0.192)
(1.925)
**
0.245
1.278**
(0.103)
(0.132)
***
0.189
1.208***
(0.026)
(0.031)
***
0.160
1.173***
(0.023)
(0.027)
-1.101***
0.333***
(0.191)
(0.064)
-0.124
0.884
(0.151)
(0.134)
-0.274*
0.760*
(0.152)
(0.116)
-0.136***
0.872***
(0.044)
(0.038)
-0.106***
0.900***
(0.036)
(0.032)
-1.177***
0.308***
(0.375)
(0.116)
***
-0.587
0.556***
(0.152)
(0.085)

Post contains Anxiety x Firm Employee Comments First on Post
Post Valence x Firm Employee Comments First on Post x Firm-Owned Forum Post
Post contains Anger x Firm Employee Comments First on Post x Firm-Owned Forum
Post
Post contains Anxiety x Firm Employee Comments First on Post x Firm-Owned
Forum Post
Monthly Network Density (lagged)
Number of Active Monthly Forum Contributors (lagged)
Weekend Post
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Post Year Fixed Effects
N (sample size)
Log Likelihood
AIC
BIC
*

p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01;
forum

Note: Standard errors are robust and clustered on

-1.026***
(0.150)
1.060**
(0.416)

0.359***
(0.054)
2.887**
(1.202)

0.553***
(0.165)

1.739***
(0.288)

1.002***
(0.151)
0.293
(0.415)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.011
(0.009)

2.722***
(0.410)
1.340
(0.556)
1.000
(0.000)
0.989
(0.009)
Yes
59,676
-135,416
270,845.40
270,908.40

Figure 2.1 A Conceptual Model of the Moderating Role of Firm Involvement on UserGenerated Service Engagement Volume
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Figure 2.2 Firm-Owned Forum and Solution Works Condition
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Figure 2.3 Firm-Unowned Forum and Solution Doesn’t Work Condition
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